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ABSTRACT
This Article calls for a move to a new phase in courts’ attitudes
toward consumer contracts. Currently, courts applying the uncon-
scionability doctrine to consumer contracts focus on the charac-
teristics of the parties and the transaction. We suggest that rather
than examining each consumer contract in isolation, courts should
inquire whether there is competition, or potential competition, over
contracts in the supplier’s market. As we show, competition over
contracts is different from competition over products or services. In
order to assess the degree of competition, or potential competition,
over contracts, courts should look at the particular features of the
supplier’s market identified in this Article, as well as examine the
potential strategic interaction among competitors. We argue that
when competition, or the threat of such competition, over consumer
contracts is sufficiently strong, these contracts should be deemed
efficient and fair, and courts should not strike down clauses incor-
porated into such contracts. Interestingly, and counterintuitively,
this conclusion holds even when consumers are uninformed. 
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We offer workable guidelines for courts as to how they could
implement the market-based approach proposed in this Article and
demonstrate how this approach could produce outcomes opposite to,
but fairer and more efficient, than the ones courts conventionally
adopt or legal scholars offer. We also identify oppressive techniques
suppliers employ in their contracts with consumers that are currently
ignored completely by courts and are expected to survive even vigor-
ous competition over contracts. We suggest that courts should be
particularly suspicious of such oppressive techniques and scrutinize
them with special care.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose you buy a computer from a manufacturer of electronic
equipment, and, after a few days of use, the computer breaks down.
Even though you purchased a warranty from the seller, you find out
that it does not cover your losses: a clause in the fine print limits
recovery to losses caused by some components of the computer but
not by others. The question of whether to strike down such a clause
is generally determined by courts according to a combination of
three considerations, mostly under the doctrine of unconscion-
ability:1 first, the information gap between the supplier and his
consumers, which exists when consumers are not aware of the full-
value loss the clause entails;2 second, whether the supplier enjoys
superior bargaining power;3 third, the degree of harshness, or one-
sidedness, of the clause.4 
Law and economics scholars have argued that only the consid-
eration regarding the information gap should matter. Even if a
supplier possessed superior bargaining power, the supplier would
not incorporate an inefficient clause into its standard-form contract
if consumers were aware of the clause and its full cost to them.
Rather, the supplier would always prefer to have an efficient
contract. To the extent that the supplier had superior bargaining
power, it would use its power to raise the price, rather than to
impose an inefficient clause.5 It is only when consumers are una-
ware of the clause, or of the full cost it is imposing upon them, that
the supplier can extract value from consumers by incorporating
inefficient terms into its standard-form contracts.6 Therefore, the
law and economics literature concludes that intervention is justified
if, and only if, consumers lack sufficient information.7
1. See infra Part III.A. 
2. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
7. As shown by Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 663 (1979), if
enough sophisticated consumers shop and compare the terms of suppliers’ deals, suppliers will
be motivated to offer efficient contracts. See also Alan Schwartz, How Much Irrationality Does
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Surprisingly, however, the question of how courts should verify
whether consumers are informed remains underexplored in legal
writings. As a result, courts conduct a transaction-specific analysis
as to whether there is a gap of information between the supplier in
question and his consumers, and reach decisions accordingly.
Determining whether consumers are sufficiently informed in a
particular case, or in a particular market, however, is an extremely
formidable task for courts.
This Article offers a new method for courts to use when consid-
ering whether to strike down an oppressive term. Instead of trying
to explore directly whether there is a gap of information between
the supplier and his consumers, courts should inquire whether
market forces have the potential to close this gap. In particular, we
develop tools according to which courts should determine whether
the supplier’s market encourages competing suppliers, or other
parties, to draw consumers’ attention to inefficient or unfair terms
in the supplier’s contract.8 If the answer is “yes,” the contract should
be deemed efficient and fair, and courts should not intervene
against it; if the answer is “no,” courts should be suspicious of op-
pressive terms in the contract and continue to apply the transaction-
specific analysis currently used to evaluate such contracts. Thus, in
the computer example mentioned above, it is very difficult for a
court to determine whether the buyer of the computer, or many of
the supplier’s consumers, are sufficiently informed. Nevertheless,
we claim that courts should not intervene if they are convinced that
the Market Permit?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 136-37 (2008) (showing that when the number of
informed consumers is sufficiently large, suppliers will refrain from including inefficient
terms in their contracts). It remains to be asked what a court should do when it is claimed
that a large portion of consumers is uninformed. Our Article provides a tool to deal with such
cases.
8. In our terminology, fairness in a contract exists when the bargain is consistent with
both parties’ reasonable expectations. According to this terminology, any fair contract is also
efficient when both parties to the contract are informed. Not every efficient contract is
necessarily fair. For example, if the contract allocates risks efficiently, and the consumer
values the product more than the product’s marginal cost, the contract is efficient. The same
contract, however, could still be unfair if the supplier reaps most of the contract’s surplus by
using deceptive techniques, thereby frustrating the consumer’s reasonable expectations. See,
e.g., W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 531 (1971) (“An unfair form will not deter sales because the
seller can easily arrange his sales so that few if any buyers will read his forms, whatever their
terms.”). 
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the computer supplier’s market encourages its competitors, or other
parties, to expose to consumers inefficient or unfair exclusionary
clauses in the supplier’s contracts. 
The virtue of our proposed market-based method is not only that
it circumvents the prohibitive costs of inquiring whether consumers
are informed. The method also helps identify cases in which court
intervention is unwarranted even when consumers are known or
presumed to be uninformed. In particular, if consumers are unin-
formed, as long as there is a credible threat that competitors or
other parties bring consumers’ attention to suppliers’ inefficient or
unfair terms, no supplier would incorporate such terms in its
contract in the first place. Thus, in equilibrium, when the threat of
competition over contracts is credible, contracts should be deemed
efficient and fair, and any court intervention is unwarranted. To
illustrate, in the computer example above, courts should not strike
down the exclusionary clause if they are convinced that in the
relevant computer market, had the clause been inefficient or unfair,
competitors or other parties would have criticized it, and the
supplier would have lost market share.9 
9. Previous authors have mentioned, in specific contexts, that competition among
suppliers could educate consumers about inefficient terms in consumer contracts. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market Corrections, 73 U. CHI.
L. REV. 111, 120 (2006) (arguing that when consumers overvalue a product, a seller of a better
product is expected to draw away such consumers by trumpeting their mistake); Xavier
Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 505-06 (2006) (identifying that when
suppliers try to exploit consumers’ mistakes, competing suppliers may wish to expose such
exploitation); David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form
Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and
Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983, 1009 n.64 (2006) (mentioning that “the
saliency of terms is, for the most part, endogenous: a supplier could snatch business from his
rival by highlighting the rival’s harsh nonsalient terms”); Lee Goldman, My Way and the
Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts,
86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 716 (1992) (stating that, in the context of choice of forum clauses in
consumer contracts, if a firm uses inefficient terms with a low price, a rival firm offering
efficient terms with a higher price would want to highlight this fact). But see Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: The Case of
Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 468 (2008) (finding no
statistically significant relationship between the degree of competition in software markets
and the incidence of pro-supplier fine print). To the best of our knowledge, however, ours is
the first article to formulate this basic notion into a systematic methodology that courts
should pursue when assessing consumer contracts.
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As we show, the effectiveness of competition over contracts in
deterring suppliers from using inefficient or unfair standard-form
contracts crucially depends on the nature of the oppressive tech-
niques used by suppliers. We distinguish between four oppressive
techniques: only the first technique has been attracting courts’
scrutiny and attention, while the other three have been, for the most
part, ignored by courts, even though they are very common and
could be very harmful. The first and most familiar technique is to
incorporate terms into the contract that deprive the consumer of a
right or a remedy to which she would have been entitled but for the
oppressive terms.10 Clauses limiting the supplier’s liability, such as
the one described in the above-mentioned computer example, are
illustrative of such terms. The second technique is to incorporate
terms into the contract that are oppressive only for some consumers
but not for others. Typically, those who are not offended by the
terms are consumers who were aware of their existence and made
some effort to avoid their adverse effects.11 An example of an SOT
is a term that deprives consumers of a remedy, but allows consum-
ers who carefully read the contract to relieve themselves of the
oppressive term.12 
The third technique is to incorporate contract terms which con-
fer benefits on some consumers but not on others.13 As in the case
of an SOT, with an SBT only those consumers who make some effort
to attain the benefits will receive them. A typical example is a term,
included in the fine print, allowing a discount only for a consumer
who is aware of the term and is willing to fill out a certain form to
receive the discount.14 The last oppressive technique that we
identify is artificial complication of contracts. Under this technique,
suppliers can extract benefits from consumers by making contracts
more complex.15 
10. Hereinafter: “traditional oppressive term” or “TOT.” 
11. Hereinafter: “selectively oppressive term” or “SOT.”
12. For example, a contract may state that the supplier bears no liability for a delay in
delivery of up to ninety days, unless the consumer asks otherwise at the time of purchase and
fills out the requisite forms. For further discussion, see infra Part I.B.1.
13. Hereinafter: “selectively beneficial term” or “SBT.”
14. For further discussion, see infra Part I.C.1.
15. For example, a supplier of services may provide several different plans in a way that
makes it difficult for a consumer to evaluate which plan best suits him. For further discussion,
see Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics, and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94
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This Article demonstrates how among the four oppressive
techniques, only the traditional oppressive term is sufficiently
affected by competition over contracts. We show how such competi-
tion cannot deter suppliers from using inefficient or unfair SOTs,
SBTs, or artificial complexity. Courts should therefore be par-
ticularly suspicious of SOTs, SBTs, and artificial complexity and
analyze them on a case-by-case basis, disregarding the degree of
competition over contracts in the market. 
TOTs, however, should be assessed differently. Because ineffi-
cient or unfair TOTs can be effectively eliminated by competition
over contracts, they should be analyzed according to the market-
based method we develop here. Rather than analyzing TOTs on the
basis of the parties to the contract and their characteristics, as
courts currently do, according to this Article’s proposal, courts
should explore the structure of the supplier’s market and the nature
and capabilities of the supplier’s rivals. Furthermore, the Article
lists four factors that could hinder the ability of competition to
expose TOTs. When these factors are particularly strong, competi-
tion over contracts cannot be counted upon, and courts should
scrutinize consumer contracts according to the transaction-specific
analysis they currently apply. The four factors are: 
(1) Backfiring. Sometimes suppliers might avoid criticizing
their rivals’ TOT so as to avoid a negative backfiring effect on
themselves. There are three types of backfiring: consumers’
backfiring on the product occurs when criticizing a rival’s
oppressive technique could expose weaknesses in the critic’s
own product or service;16 consumers’ backfiring on the contract
occurs when exposing a rival’s TOT requires the criticizing
CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1102-06 (2009) (showing the complexity of subprime mortgage
contracts and explaining accordingly that competition cannot solve inefficiencies in such
contracts); Gilo & Porat, supra note 9, at 1004-05 (showing how suppliers can use complexity
in their consumer contracts in order to stifle competition); infra Part I.D.1. 
16. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response
to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259, 339 (2000) (arguing that firms
may not want to advertise the safety of their product because this raises consumers’
awareness to the risk in all such products and reduces their demand); Jeff Sovern, Toward
a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1635, 1680 (2006) (arguing that a firm may not want to highlight that it does
not bind arbitration in a distant forum so as not to draw consumers’ attention to the
probability of disputes). 
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supplier to stop using similar TOTs himself; and rivals’
backfiring occurs when the criticized supplier is driven to
retaliate. 
(2) Attracting Unwanted Consumers. At times when a supplier
exposes TOTs in his rivals’ contracts he ends up “gaining”
unwanted, high-cost consumers.17 This could be a reason not to
engage in such an exposition in the first place. 
(3) Benefit Externalization. A supplier might avoid criticizing
his competitors’ TOTs because the benefits of such efforts
would be shared by other rival suppliers, while the criticizing
supplier would shoulder the entire cost.18 
(4) Irresponsive Consumers. In certain situations, many con-
sumers would not change their consumption decisions even if
competition exposing the TOT were to take place. In such
cases, highlighting a rival supplier’s TOT could be unreward-
ing.19
This Article offers to courts a coherent and systematic method
for assessing TOTs based on these insights. For example, it shows
how, contrary to the conventional wisdom, a TOT is more likely to
be efficient and fair in a competitive market in which most suppliers
adopt it. It also shows how a competitive market for a product or
service that is essential to consumers justifies less intervention
against TOTs than a market in which the product or service is
nonessential. Also, in many instances, TOTs that qualify a right
granted by the supplier himself should be treated more leniently
than TOTs that qualify a default rule imposed by law. Accordingly,
this Article offers courts workable guidelines by which they can
shape their intervention policies against consumer contracts.
17. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1242 (2003) (arguing that a firm would not want
to brag about its lack of an arbitration clause because this might attract consumers likely to
sue the firm).
18. See Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L.
& ECON. 491, 527 (1981) (claiming that firms may not have suitable incentives to disclose to
consumers positive information about their product when rivals selling the same product
would share the benefits from such disclosure); R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My
Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority To Correct for Imperfect Information,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 659 (1996).
19. See Korobkin, supra note 17, at 1239 (claiming that highlighting the existence of a
forum selection clause is not likely to change consumers’ purchase decisions).
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This Article also demonstrates how competition over contracts
takes place in the real world. It provides numerous examples of
suppliers’ campaigns criticizing their rivals’ contracts.20 The inci-
dence of such campaigns actually understates the true impact of
competition over contracts for two reasons. First, it is expected that
many suppliers engage in covert efforts to criticize their rivals; for
example, through their sales representatives. Second, in a market
in which a credible threat of competition over contracts exists, TOTs
are expected to be efficient and fair even where no such competition
is actually observed: in such markets, suppliers would be deterred
from employing inefficient or unfair TOTs.
This Article is organized as follows: In Part I we describe the four
oppressive techniques, discuss the motivations for suppliers to use
them, and also expose their potential welfare-reducing and wel-
fare-enhancing effects. In this Part, we shall ignore the corrective
potential of competition over contracts. Part II considers how
competition affects the efficiency and fairness of each of the four
oppressive techniques identified in Part I. As we show, intense
competition over contracts could expose inefficient and unfair TOTs,
but not SOTs, SBTs, and complexity. As a result, we propose that
SOTs, SBTs, and artificial complexity, which are not subject to
market discipline, be analyzed according to strict case-by-case
scrutiny. In this Part, we also analyze the factors that could prevent
competition over contracts from guaranteeing efficient TOTs. Part
III draws workable guidelines from the results obtained in Parts I
and II as to how courts could employ the market-based methodology
to TOTs.
I. OPPRESSIVE TECHNIQUES
In this Part, we present four oppressive techniques used by
suppliers in their contracts with consumers. Only the first one has
been extensively discussed in court decisions. With regard to each
technique, we expose suppliers’ motivations for employing it and
evaluate it from a social perspective. The effects of competition on
each technique are ignored at this stage. 
20. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
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A. Traditional Oppressive Terms
1. The Technique
Many standard-form contracts contain terms that deprive con-
sumers of rights or remedies to which they would be entitled but
for these terms. We call such terms “traditional oppressive terms”
(TOTs). Example 1 illustrates a TOT.
Example 1. TV Set. In a contract for the provision of a TV set,
the time of delivery is set for January 1, 2010. In the
boilerplate, however, there is a clause stating that “the supplier
bears no liability for a delay in delivery of up to ninety days.”21 
In Example 1, the TOT exempts the supplier from contractual
liability, but in the next example, the TOT caps tort damages. 
Example 2. The Dry Cleaner. A dry cleaner offers its consumers
a standard-form contract, which contains a term stating that
“the Dry Cleaner’s liability per item is limited to fifteen times
the fee paid for the damaged or lost item.”22
2. Suppliers’ Possible Motivations 
In order to understand why suppliers use TOTs, one should
distinguish between two states of the world: one, where there is no
gap of information between the suppliers and the consumers; the
other, where there is such a gap. Absent an information gap
between the supplier and his consumers, there is a solid basis for
21. See Corinno Civetta Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 493 N.E.2d 905, 908 (N.Y.
1986) (“[D]amages resulting from uncontemplated delays caused by the contractee may be
recovered despite the existence of a broad exculpatory clause relieving the contractee from
liability.”). In Fowler, Rodriguez, Kingsmill, Flint, Gray & Chalos, L.L.P. v. Island Props.,
L.L.C., 833 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148 (App. Div. 2007), the court ruled that 
[g]enerally, even with such a [broad exculpatory] clause, damages may be
recovered for: (1) delays caused by the contractee’s bad faith or its willful,
malicious, or grossly negligent conduct, (2) uncontemplated delays, (3) delays so
unreasonable that they constitute an intentional abandonment of the contract
by the contractee, and (4) delays resulting from the contractee’s breach of a
fundamental obligation of the contract.
22. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 119-20 (1993)
(stating that standard-form contracts are common in markets that are highly competitive, dry
cleaning being a typical example).
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assuming that the supplier incorporated the TOT into the contract
in order to increase the value of the contract to himself as well as to
consumers. The explanation is that when both parties to a contract
possess all relevant information, they strive to incorporate efficient
terms into their contract that increase their mutual benefit.23 This
reasoning applies even when one of the parties (the supplier)
enjoys superior bargaining power vis-à-vis the other party (the
consumer).24 In contrast, when consumers are not fully aware of the
loss of value the TOT imposes upon them, there is a risk that the
supplier will incorporate a TOT into his standard-form contracts so
as to extract value from consumers, without the latter being aware
of it, and will even induce some consumers to buy a product they
would not have bought had they been aware of its true cost to
them.25 
23. For the case without an information gap, see Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs
of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361,
363 (1991) (mentioning that sellers have incentives to select an efficient rule on their own);
Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the
Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 586 (1990) (“In a free market, exchanges among
knowledgeable rational people are expected to result in Pareto superior results.”). For the case
with an information gap, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 208 (5th
ed. 2008) (“[T]he presence of asymmetric information can sometimes preclude otherwise
mutually beneficial exchanges from taking place.”); 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 34
(A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (“[A]symmetric information between the
parties at the time a contract is negotiated can lead to distortions in the resulting contract vis-
à-vis the contract that would have been negotiated under symmetric information.”). 
24. See Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 941 (2006)
(explaining that even a monopolist looks for efficient warranty terms); A. Michael Spence,
Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 BELL J. ECON. 417, 417 (1975) (showing that a
monopolist prefers to offer quality preferred by the “marginal consumer”—the first consumer
to leave the supplier when price goes up—and elect a price so as to maximize its profits).
25. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for
Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 770 (1993) (arguing that without full information,
consumers are unable to make consumption and warranty decisions that reflect their true
preferences); Korobkin, supra note 17, at 1217-18 (“Efficiency requires not only that buyers be
aware of the content of form contracts, but also that they fully incorporate that information
into their purchase decisions. Because buyers are boundedly rational rather than fully
rational decisionmakers, they will infrequently satisfy this requirement.”); Meyerson, supra
note 23, at 585.
146 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:133
3. Welfare Concerns
Absent information gaps in which consumers lack sufficient
information, all terms in standard-form contracts should be deemed
welfare-enhancing and therefore efficient. There is no need to ex-
plore, in particular, whether a term is efficient because, regardless
of his bargaining position, the supplier only loses by including
inefficient terms in his contract. Also, no particular fairness concern
emerges when there is no gap of information between the parties
because the consumer got exactly what he expected, or reasonably
could expect, to get. 
If, however, consumers are not informed enough as to the op-
pressive term or its cost to them, three kinds of efficiency concerns
arise. First, suppliers may incorporate terms into the contract that
allocate risks between the parties inefficiently (“inefficient alloca-
tion of risks”). For example, the TV supplier in Example 1 might
include the TOT relieving him from liability for late delivery even
when it saves him less than the cost it imposes on the consumer.
Second, regardless of whether the term involves inefficient alloca-
tion of risks, another form of inefficiency may evolve: many
uninformed consumers might buy products and services that they
should not have bought (“inefficient contracting”). For example,
regardless of the TOT’s efficiency, some consumers who bought the
TV would not have bought it had they been aware of the TOT.
Third, and, again, regardless of whether the TOT allocates risks
efficiently, informed consumers might refrain from buying the
product due to the TOT (“inefficient noncontracting”).26 In Example
1, the TOT imposes a cost on consumers due to late delivery, yet this
is not reflected in the TV’s price. A consumer who understands this
may well refrain from buying the TV, although it would have been
socially warranted for him to buy it for its fair price.
The normative concerns with TOTs are not limited to inefficien-
cies. TOTs also raise fairness concerns because they enable
suppliers to extract value from consumers without their knowledge
26. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 72-73 (1982) (“[The]
misallocation of resources results in diminished satisfaction of society’s wants, and thus, in
terms of what society values, a reduction of society’s total wealth.”).
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and induce consumers to buy products and services they do not
really want. As such, TOTs constitute a form of deception. 
Accordingly, when consumers are not well-enough informed,
both inefficiency and unfairness could result. It is here, however,
that two crucial questions arise: First, how can we know whether
consumers are well-enough informed? Second, what happens if
consumers are not well-enough informed? Should it then be pre-
sumed that the TOT creates inefficient allocation of risks, inefficient
contracting, inefficient noncontracting, or unfairness? As we will see
in Parts II and III of the Article, a useful way to answer these two
important questions is to explore the degree and type of competition
over contracts in the supplier’s market.
B. Selectively Oppressive Terms 
1. The Technique
As opposed to TOTs, selectively oppressive terms (“SOTs”) are
oppressive only for some consumers. Consider the following
variation of Example 1.
Example 3. TV Set II. In a contract for the provision of a TV
set, the time of delivery is set for January 1, 2010. In the
boilerplate, however, there is a clause stating that “the supplier
bears no liability for a delay in delivery of up to ninety days,
unless the consumer asks otherwise at the time of purchase and
fills out the requisite forms.” Filling out the requisite forms
takes no more than a couple of minutes and entails no benefit
to the supplier.
 As opposed to Example 1, any consumer who carefully reads the
standard-form contract in Example 3 will understand that she can
request the removal of the exclusionary clause at no additional cost
to herself. The only reason for not doing so would be if the consumer
were not aware of the exclusionary clause and her easy way out of
it. Thus, with the type of SOT illustrated in Example 3, there is
always an information gap between the supplier and some of his
consumers. Only consumers who bear the transaction costs involved
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in a careful reading of the fine print will learn of the SOT and take
costless steps to avoid it.27
An example of an SOT is a term in a contract for the sale of a
product, according to which the product’s warranty is conditioned
upon the buyer keeping the original receipt.28 Only buyers who read
the contract and remember to retain the receipt enjoy the warranty,
while other buyers forfeit it.29 Another example of an SOT is a term
in a travel insurance policy in which coverage of losses due to theft
is conditioned upon reporting the theft to the police within twenty-
four hours.30 Insureds who either do not read the terms of the policy
carefully or fail to comply with this specific term for other reasons
are denied compensation, whereas those who bear the transaction
costs of reading the term and complying with it are fully compen-
sated.31 A third example concerns granting benefits to consumers,
but limiting eligibility for the benefit to a short period of time in the
fine print. Many consumers assume they will receive the benefit,
27. Not every SOT is characterized by consumers not being aware that there is a way out
of the oppressive term. To illustrate, suppose that in Example 3, filling out the requisite forms
does not take just a couple of minutes as in the original example, but rather, is time
consuming. With such an SOT, even if all consumers are aware of its existence, some of them
will give up on filling out the forms to save time, knowing they will then have to bear the costs
of the exclusionary clause. Interestingly, in this variation of Example 3, there is no
information gap between any consumer and the supplier. Nevertheless, the oppressive term
is selective: some consumers are willing to fill out the forms and relieve themselves of the
oppressive clause, and some are not willing to do so and thus remain subject to this clause.
28. See, e.g., B&H Photo Video Pro Audio Privacy and Security, Sagemax Terms and
Conditions, http://www.bhphotovideo.com/find/sagemaxTC.jsp (last visited Sept. 29, 2010)
(Sagemax’s insurance contract for LCD televisions, instructing that the receipt is “an integral
part” of the contract, and the consumer “may be required to reference it to obtain service”). 
29. Arguably, asking for the original receipt could be motivated by the supplier’s desire
to save verification costs as to the validity of the warranty. It seems, however, that other
means of verification—certainly in the computer age—could be at least as effective and almost
costless.
30. See, e.g., Access America—Travel Insurance & Assistance, Individual Travel
Certificate of Insurance Form No. 52.401 WDI, http://www.worldnomads.com/policy_wording.
aspx?uid=7d4701fdcb8f487dbef849f8673502f1 (last visited Sept. 29, 2010) (offering coverage
for baggage, which states that “[y]ou must notify the appropriate local authorities at the place
the loss occurred and inform them of the value and description of Your [sic] property within
24 hours after the loss”).
31. Here too an argument can be made that reporting to the police immediately serves the
insurer’s interests in reducing risks. But it is quite obvious that for many types of thefts, in
many countries, reporting to the police is almost useless, and in any case, the penalty for
failing to report within twenty-four hours—deprivation of entitlement to any compensation
—is rather draconian. 
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while in fact, they do so only if they act promptly.32 A final example
is a term in a car rental contract that penalizes the consumer for not
picking up the car she has reserved, but then includes in the fine
print a process for partly waiving the penalty.33 Only consumers
who are well aware of this particular term and who are willing to
bear the transaction costs involved in getting the partial waiver will
receive it; many others will not receive it.34 
2. Suppliers’ Possible Motivations 
Suppliers may want to use SOTs for several reasons. To begin
with, SOTs involve benefits for the supplier that resemble those
derived from using TOTs: SOTs allow suppliers to extract value
from uninformed consumers. Notwithstanding this similarity
between TOTs and SOTs, a very important distinction between
them should be made: with a TOT, the supplier takes the risk of
losing informed consumers who find the TOT in the fine print and
consequently decide not to buy the product. With a SOT, the
supplier can enjoy the best of both worlds: he manages to deceive
32. For example, American Airlines offers a “Low Fare Promise,” according to which the
consumer receives a fifty-dollar coupon from American Airlines if she provides a lower rate
on another airline. In order to receive such a benefit, the claim must be submitted by
midnight on the same day of the purchase from American Airlines among other conditions.
See Student Scrooge, http://www.studentscrooge.com/2008/10/09/the-american-airlines-low-
fare-guarantee/ (Oct. 9, 2008) (a student’s blog describing the fine print behind American
Airlines’ low-fare guarantee).
33. The Hertz car rental agency, for example, partly refunds the prepayment in case of
a “No Show,” but only “if [the consumer] write[s] to [Hertz] within 90 days of the Pick Up Date
at Hertz Prepaid Accounting Department.” Hertz, Rental Qualifications and Requirements,
https://www.hertz.com/rentacar/reservation/reviewmodifycancel/templates/rentalTerms.js
p?KEYWORD=CANCELLATION&EOAG=DUSN61 (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
34. There could also be ex post SOTs; namely, oppressive terms that are applied in a
discriminatory manner by suppliers. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided
Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 828 (2006) (explaining
the efficiencies of many one-sided terms in consumer contracts, which are selectively applied).
Also, “add-ons”—expensive services or products that are added on to the original deal—bear
some resemblance to SOTs. See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 9, at 507-08 (analyzing the case
of avoidable add-ons, such as the minibar or other servies at a hotel). As with SOTs, some
consumers manage to avoid the add-ons by not using them, but others end up using them. The
difference between an avoidable add-on (such as a hotel minibar) and an SOT is that most
consumers are aware of their oppressive add-on before they decide whether to use it. With an
SOT, on the other hand, uninformed consumers are simply unaware of the oppressive term
hidden in the fine print and unaware of their ability to avoid it.
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consumers vulnerable to deception while retaining consumers who
cannot be fooled. Informed consumers can buy from the supplier
while escaping the oppressive term.35 
Accordingly, SOTs allow suppliers to benefit informed consumers
at the expense of uninformed consumers, thereby discriminating in
favor of the former. Such a strategy could induce informed consum-
ers to buy the supplier’s product or service even when they would
not have bought it otherwise. Let us illustrate in more detail how
SOTs allow suppliers to improve the deal they offer informed
consumers at the expense of the uninformed consumers. Suppose
the price of a supplier’s TV set when there is no SOT hidden in the
contract and all consumers are fully informed is ten dollars. A
supplier who chooses to incorporate the SOT of Example 3 into his
contracts could exploit uninformed consumers in the following way:
he could charge all consumers a price of nine dollars, but extract a
value of two dollars from uninformed consumers through the SOT.
In such a scenario, uninformed consumers would be subject to the
oppressive term hidden in the fine print, relieving the supplier of
liability for late delivery. Informed consumers, who see the SOT and
fill out the forms to escape the oppressive term, pay nine dollars and
receive the TV on time. 
As a result, de facto, it is as if informed consumers pay nine
dollars, while uninformed consumers pay eleven dollars. The
supplier saves the costs of having an obligation to deliver on time to
uninformed consumers. These profits, made at the expense of
uninformed consumers, can be used to enable the price reduction
from ten dollars to nine dollars. Accordingly, informed consumers
who pay nine dollars and receive the TV on time are subsidized by
the uninformed consumers. This benefits the supplier because
informed consumers are typically more sensitive to the terms of the
deal, and many of them would not have bought the TV at the
original price of ten dollars.
35. Note that some informed consumers would have entered into the contract even if they
had not been able to remove the oppressive term. Supposedly, the supplier could have offered
such consumers the same deal with a TOT and earned more. But for the supplier, it is often
more important to retain the more sensitive, informed consumers, who would not have bought
the product if they were subject to the oppressive term. 
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Why are informed consumers typically more sensitive to the
terms of the deal than uninformed consumers? Informed consumers
are those who waive the SOT and incur the transaction costs of
reading the contract carefully, filling out the requisite forms, as in
Example 3, and so forth. Their willingness to do so can serve as a
proxy for their sensitivity to the terms of the deal.36 
In particular, consumers who are willing to pay attention to the
fine print and escape the oppressive term are typically characterized
as one or more of the following: (a) those who value their time less
and their money more compared to others; such consumers are also
typically more sensitive to what they receive for their money; (b)
large or repeat buyers, for whom investing the transaction costs
involved in a careful reading and understanding of the contract and
filling out the forms is worthwhile given the high volume of their
business with the supplier; such consumers too are typically
sensitive to oppressive terms in the contract; and (c) sophisticated
consumers for whom the transaction costs are relatively low because
they are trained in reading and understanding such contracts and
filling out the forms. To the extent that sophisticated consumers are
also those better aware of alternative products, they too are often
“trigger happy” with regard to rejecting the supplier’s product.37 
Another reason for suppliers to employ SOTs is that a contract
with an SOT may look fairer than the same contract with a TOT.
Suppliers use TOTs to extract value from uninformed consumers.
However, they bear the risk of courts striking the term down.38 If
suppliers use an SOT instead, as in Example 3, they benefit from
both worlds: on the one hand, many consumers would shoulder the
consequences of the oppressive term without being aware of it, as
with a TOT; but on the other hand, the term cannot be easily
challenged in court because it appears to be fair. After all, in
Example 3, a consumer could easily avoid the exclusionary clause
if she filled out the requisite forms. The supplier could easily come
up with an explanation justifying the requirement to fill out forms.
36. Gilo & Porat, supra note 9, at 996-97 (discussing the imposition of transaction costs
on consumers to distinguish those who are more price sensitive from those who are less
sensitive to price). 
37. See id. at 997.
38. See infra Part III.A. 
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The above-mentioned car rental example39 could also be explained
in this way: the damages imposed upon the consumer for late
delivery could be considered unreasonable by courts and struck
down. However, the court may change its mind if it assumes that
most of the penalty could “easily” be waived in favor of consumers
who ask for it to be waived. The car rental company could come up
with a reason for imposing the damages in the first place, and for
allowing a subsequent refund at a later stage. 
The innocent appearance of the contract could also protect the
supplier from critical public opinion, as well as from his own
consumers who might later realize that they ended up with the
worst deal. Such consumers, when acknowledging they could have
easily received the better deal, might tend to blame themselves, not
the supplier.40
A final reason suppliers might prefer to use SOTs rather than
TOTs is that TOTs, as we shall see in Part II, can at times expose
the supplier to criticism by his rivals and cause the supplier to lose
market share. As we show, this is not the case with an SOT.41 A
rival supplier would derive little benefit from criticizing the sup-
plier’s SOT.42
3. Welfare Concerns
When consumers are not informed enough, using SOTs may be at
least as problematic as using TOTs: in both cases the supplier
extracts value from consumers without the latter being aware of it.
As with TOTs, SOTs raise fairness concerns, may allocate risks
inefficiently, and may create inefficient contracting by causing
uninformed consumers to buy a product that they do not really
want.43
However, as noted, and unlike TOTs, SOTs can facilitate “price
discrimination” between informed consumers—those often more
sensitive to the terms of the deal—and uninformed consumers—
39. Supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
40. But occasionally the reverse would be true: consumers may develop antagonism
toward a supplier who failed to make the SOT more salient. 
41. See infra Part II.A.2.
42. See infra Part II.A.2.
43. See supra Part I.A.3.
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those often less sensitive to the terms of the deal. From an efficiency
perspective, the upside of such discrimination is that it may allow
the supplier to improve the terms it grants to consumers who have
waived the SOT and prevent them from deciding not to buy the
product at all.44 We label this welfare-enhancing feature of SOTs
“bringing consumers on board.” That is, absent the SOT, efficient
transactions between the supplier and some informed consumers
would not have taken place.45
SOTs might also involve a distributional justice concern.46
Because SOTs enable price discrimination, they cause inequality
among consumers: some consumers get better deals than others.47
However, under an SOT, the consumers who enjoy the better deal
are often the less wealthy ones: those who value their time less and
their money more compared to others, and therefore are willing to
incur the transaction costs required for waiving the SOTs.48 This
could mitigate, or even overrule, the distributional justice concerns
in using SOTs.
Finally, another important difference between SOTs and TOTs
relates to the higher sustainability of SOTs. If many consumers
were informed, socially harmful TOTs would not survive.49 This is
44. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 139 (1988) (showing
how price discrimination could improve welfare by inducing consumers who are more sensi-
tive to price to buy the product). 
45. SOTs’ ability to discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers could also
serve as an anticompetitive device that facilitates collusion among competing suppliers. The
reasons for this resemble those of selectively beneficial terms, which are discussed below. See
infra note 58 and accompanying text.
46. It is a controversial question whether the distribution of wealth should be a concern
for legal rules or left to the tax system. See TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, TORTS, EGALITARIANISM, AND
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 17 (2007) (arguing that distributive justice should be a concern when
defining tort rules); Louis Kaplow & Stephen Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?
Clarifying the Roles of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 821, 821 (2000) (arguing for the superiority of the tax system in this respect). In the
context of our discussion, we merely wish to point out, as a positive matter, that distributive
effects exist, without taking sides as to whether these effects also have normative impli-
cations.
47. On the other hand, one could claim that SOTs enhance distributional justice among
consumers to the extent that they cause consumers who value the product more to pay more.
Arguably, those who benefit more from the product should indeed pay more.
48. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
49. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 7, at 673-76 (showing that intervention against
contract terms is undesirable when a mass of consumers is sufficiently informed); supra Part
I.A.2. 
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not the case with SOTs, because even with a mass of informed
consumers, the supplier would not remove a socially unwarranted
SOT: he would still be able to exploit the uninformed consumers
while keeping the informed consumers happy.50
In Part II, we show that competition cannot be counted upon to
deter suppliers from using inefficient and unfair SOTs. Hence, in
stark contrast to courts’ complete disregard of SOTs, they actually
deserve strict legal scrutiny, even more so than TOTs. As shown in
Part II, inefficient or unfair TOTs may be competed away under
certain circumstances, but this is shown not to be the case with
SOTs.
C. Selectively Beneficial Terms
1. The Technique
The mirror image of an SOT is a selectively beneficial term
(“SBT”). While SOTs are oppressive for only some consumers, SBTs
are beneficial for only some consumers. Example 4 illustrates how
an SBT works. 
Example 4. Special Discount. A supplier who sells computers
offers a special discount in the fine print to consumers who fill
out a certain form and mail it back to the supplier. Only
consumers who read the fine print carefully and remember to
fill out the form and mail it back enjoy the special discount.
As opposed to TOTs and SOTs, which create a bad surprise for
uninformed consumers and no surprise for informed consumers, an
SBT does not create a surprise for either informed or uninformed
consumers. In Example 4, consumers who do not read the contract,
and therefore do not get the special discount, are not misled by the
supplier: they receive exactly what they expect. However, with
SBTs, consumers who bear certain transaction costs get better deals
50. As noted, Schwartz and Wilde show that when a large enough percentage of
consumers are informed, suppliers are induced to include efficient terms in their contracts.
They assume, however, that suppliers offer the same contractual terms to all consumers.
Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 7, at 673-76. In contrast, with an SOT, informed consumers are
relieved from the oppressive term while uninformed consumers are not. This is why a mass
of informed consumers would not suffice to deter the supplier from using an SOT. 
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than others. In this respect, SBTs resemble SOTs. To illustrate, if
in the above-mentioned example, the posted price for a computer is
eleven dollars and there is a special discount of two dollars in the
fine print, uninformed consumers end up paying eleven dollars,
while informed consumers end up paying only nine dollars.51
There are many real-life cases in which consumers who are
willing to incur the transaction costs of reading and understanding
their contracts with their suppliers receive greater benefits. One
example is hiding a best-price guarantee in the fine print.52 Another
example is common in subscription sales. Internet service providers
often have a provision in the fine print granting new customers an
option to cancel within a certain period of time and get their money
back.53 Many consumers are not aware of this option and there-
fore do not execute it. Probably those who are more hesitant about
signing up would tend to incur the transaction costs of exploring all
the terms of the contract offered to them. They are the ones who
would utilize the benefit.54 
51. As with SOTs, it is possible to distinguish between two types of SBTs. In the first type,
the transaction costs a consumer needs to incur in order to receive the benefits consist merely
of the time spent to read and understand the contract. The other type of SBT is one in which
consumers know they are required to bear transaction costs—such as filling out time-
consuming forms—in order to be entitled to the benefits.
52. In this example, the supplier undertakes in the fine print to match any competing
offer given by another supplier. See Aaron S. Edlin, Do Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies
Guarantee High Prices, and Can Antitrust Rise to the Challenge?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 528, 529-
31 (1997). Edlin points out that low-price guarantees enable price discrimination between
customers who cite a competing price and other consumers. Id. at 531. Our additional insight
is that suppliers may want to “hide” their low-price guarantees in the fine print, rather than
making them salient, so that only the particularly price-sensitive consumers will take
advantage of the guarantees. 
53. See, for example, the terms of sale of Speakeasy, which offers broadband Internet
services: “Speakeasy offers a 25-day Trial Period on all ADSL services. If Customer feels that
Customer must cancel within 25 calendar days of Customer’s Activation Date, Customer may
do so without being subject to a Disconnection Fee.” Speakeasy, Terms of Service, http://www.
speakeasy.net/tos/msa.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2010). 
54. Cf. Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How
Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Business and Consumers,
104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 864-65, 877 (2006) (arguing that suppliers often extend benefits
beyond standard-form consumer contract terms and explaining their motivations for doing so).
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2. Suppliers’ Possible Motivations
As is evident from the examples above, the idea behind SBTs is
to confer benefits only on consumers who appreciate them. Hence,
as with SOTs, SBTs extract more value from uninformed consumers
while at the same time attracting informed consumers, who incur
the transaction costs of reading the contract and filling out the
form, as in Example 4. These latter consumers are typically more
sensitive to the terms of the deal, and many of them would not buy
the product without the beneficial term. But there is an important
difference between SOTs and SBTs in this respect. As noted,
suppliers might use SOTs in order to fool uninformed consumers
into buying a product under terms they would not have accepted
had they known about them. This is not the case with SBTs, when
even uninformed consumers buy what they aimed to buy; namely,
the product without the special benefit.
This also illuminates how SOTs and SBTs feature two different
modes of price discrimination. With SBTs, all consumers know how
much they are paying and what they are receiving. In contrast, with
SOTs, only informed consumers have it right. This difference bears
on the potential profits a supplier could derive from each of these
two techniques. With an SBT, because uninformed consumers know
of the high price they are paying, such as a posted price of eleven
dollars in Example 4, they might refrain from buying the supplier’s
product. This is not the case with an SOT in which uninformed
consumers mistakenly believe they are paying a relatively low price
for a contract without the oppressive term. Hence the supplier does
not lose their business.
Finally, as with SOTs, the supplier can use SBTs to make the
contract appear fair, thereby immunizing it from both court and
consumer scrutiny. The supplier may have wanted to use a TOT,
but was well aware that a TOT could be struck down by courts as
unfair. To avoid this, in addition to the TOT, the supplier could
incorporate an SBT into the contract in order to set the stage for the
argument that the contract is balanced and fair. By using an SBT
and not a beneficial term which applies to all consumers, the
supplier gains more: only some consumers receive the benefits,
while the argument that the contract is balanced and fair may still
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be accepted by courts. Thus, suppose that in Example 4 there was
a TOT immunizing the supplier from liability for a delay of up to
ninety days in delivery, as in Example 1. Such a TOT is at risk of
invalidation by courts. The supplier could argue, however, that
because of the TOT, he offered consumers a special discount in an
SBT, which makes the price lower than that of his competitors. This
strategy could protect the supplier from courts’ and others’ scrutiny,
even though most consumers, being uninformed, would pay the full
price and bear the costs of the oppressive clause.
3. Welfare Concerns
From a social welfare perspective, SBTs are less problematic than
TOTs or SOTs. As noted, TOTs and SOTs present a bad surprise for
uninformed consumers.55 This is not the case with SBTs, in which
uninformed consumers receive what they expected to get. Unlike
TOTs and SOTs, SBTs cannot cause consumers to buy products
they do not really want. This implies that TOTs and SOTs possess
greater potential for inefficiencies. 
The efficiency implications of an SBT depend on the social
outcome of the price discrimination it allows, which is generally
ambiguous. On the one hand, the SBT effectively reduces the price
paid by informed consumers and this could induce such consumers
to buy the product. An SBT features the social advantage of
“bringing consumers on board.” This effect promotes social welfare.56
On the other hand, the price uninformed consumers pay under an
SBT is typically higher than the price consumers would pay absent
such price discrimination. This could cause some uninformed
consumers not to buy the product. Accordingly, SBTs also feature
“inefficient noncontracting”—they could cause efficient transactions
not to take place. The latter effect has a negative impact on social
welfare.57 Furthermore, as we show elsewhere, SBTs could hinder
55. An important criterion for court intervention in consumer contracts is whether the
arguably problematic terms posed a bad surprise for the consumer. See infra note 112. 
56. See 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1089 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell
eds., 2007) (“[P]rice discrimination generates greater seller profits yet may well be benign or
even favorable on average for consumers.”); TIROLE, supra note 44, at 138 (“[A] necessary
condition for price discrimination to be preferred socially is that it raise [sic] total output.”).
57. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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competition in certain cases, by making tacit or explicit collusion
between competitors more likely.58 
From a fairness perspective, SBTs are much less problematic—
if at all—than TOTs and SOTs: consumers are not deceived by
suppliers because they receive what they expected to get. The
situation might be different where there is a special relationship
between the supplier and the consumer. At times, a special relation-
ship warrants the recognition of a duty on the part of the supplier
to disclose explicitly to consumers the existence of an SBT in his
standard-form contract.59 SBTs might also create a distributional
justice concern because they create inequality among consumers.
Still, as with SOTs, in the case of SBTs, consumers who enjoy better
deals are often the less wealthy ones. This helps alleviate, or even
remove, distributive justice concerns.60
In Part II we show how competition over contracts cannot really
be trusted to remove SBTs. 
D. Complexity
1. The Technique
The final oppressive technique often used by suppliers is artificial
complication of the contract. The next example is illustrative. 
Example 5. Combined Internet and Multichannel TV Plans. An
Internet provider that also supplies multichannel TV offers a
menu of plans. Each plan is different than the others with
regard to the general monthly fee, fee per special channels or
group of channels, pay-per-view, video on demand services,
bandwidth, modes of payment, and all of the permutations of
58. See Gilo & Porat, supra note 9, at 1025-29.
59. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bussen Quarries, Inc. v. Thomas, 938 F.2d 831, 834 (8th
Cir. 1991) (“The duty to disclose may arise from inequality of position, a fiduciary relationship
between the parties, or a demonstration of superior knowledge on the part of one party that
is not within the fair and reasonable reach of the other party.”); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Little Rock, Ark., 774 F.2d 909, 913 (8th Cir. 1985) (“The
duty to speak may be based on special circumstances, such as a confidential relationship, in
which one party knows that another is relying on a misrepresentation to his detriment.”). 
60. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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the above parameters, in ways that make it difficult for a
consumer to evaluate the plans.
There are numerous examples in which there is good reason to
suspect the complication of contracts is artificial. Contracts with
cellular phone companies61 and credit card firms,62 as well as con-
tracts for mortgages63 and car rentals64 are common examples. 
2. Suppliers’ Possible Motivations
The complexity of the provider’s contracts in Example 5 creates
a distinction among consumers similar to that of SOTs or SBTs. It
is often the case that consumers who better understand these
complexities, and hence could opt for the best deals, are the same
consumers who delve into a supplier’s fine print to avoid SOTs or to
look for SBTs. Other consumers, because they find the transaction
costs of understanding complex contracts prohibitively high, might
get a poorer deal. Accordingly, complexity, like SBTs and SOTs, can
serve as a tool for price discrimination in favor of the better-
informed group of consumers. 
In addition to price discrimination, artificially complicated con-
tracts could benefit the supplier in other ways. In particular,
complicating contracts is sometimes necessary for the success of the
other oppressive techniques used by suppliers. TOTs, SOTs, and
SBTs are typically hidden in the fine print and their effectiveness
often depends on consumers’ difficulties in locating and under-
standing them. The degree of the contract’s complexity affects the
quantity of uninformed consumers. The level of the contract’s arti-
ficial complexity therefore depends on how many consumers the
supplier wishes to keep uninformed. If the supplier wishes to exploit
uninformed consumers as much as possible with a TOT or SOT, he
might artificially make his contracts particularly complex. If he
61. Several websites offer comprehensive comparisons between cellular phone companies
and cellular plans. See, e.g., Cell Phones Etc., http://www.cellphones.ca/cell-plans (last visited
Sept. 29, 2010); MyRatePlan.com, http://www.myrateplan.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
62. For a comparison between the different packages offered by various credit card firms,
see CreditCards.com, http://www.creditcards.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2010). 
63. See Bar-Gill, supra note 15, at 1102-03.
64. See Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899, 903 (2006)
(describing the complexity of car rental contracts). 
160 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:133
wishes to allow some consumers to enjoy a special benefit, as with
an SBT, the artificial complexity of his contracts will probably be
more moderate.
3. Welfare Concerns
Using complexity to hide a TOT or SOT could extract value from
uninformed consumers and also induce some of them to buy
products they would not have bought but for the complex nature of
the contract. Hence, artificial complexity could feature inefficiencies,
such as inefficient allocation of risks, inefficient contracting by
uninformed consumers, or inefficient noncontracting by informed
consumers, as well as unfairness and distributive justice concerns
similar to those created by TOTs and SOTs. 
Using complexity without the intention to hide TOTs or SOTs,
that is, complexity per se, could create price discrimination, the
efficiency of which is ambiguous. As with SBTs, the upside of such
discrimination is “bringing consumers on board,” but the downside
is inefficient noncontracting. In addition, such complexity could
create inefficient contracting. That is, complexity per se could lure
consumers to enter contracts they would not have entered had they
been informed. To illustrate, in Example 5 when uninformed con-
sumers cannot really pick the package of multichannel TV and
Internet services most suitable to their needs, they may well find
themselves with an unsuitable package that they would never have
chosen had they understood the contract. 
Price discrimination enabled by complexity per se also raises
distributive justice issues, but they are less of a concern to the
extent that the consumers discriminated against are the rich.
Contract complexity could also stifle competition in the market, as
it makes it harder for consumers to compare among competing
suppliers.65 This makes suppliers less likely to try to compete for
65. Indeed, Bruce Cran, president of the Consumers’ Association of Canada, said, “They
(wireless carriers) deliberately make it very difficult to make comparisons.” Gillian Shaw,
‘Piles of Complaints’ over iPhone Data Pricing, FINANCIAL POST, July 8, 2008, http://www.
financialpost.com/story.html?id=640478. In the same vein, Natalie Woodroofe, spokeswoman
for U.K. credit card issuer Nationwide, said, “In the current market, it is very difficult for
British consumers to make an informed choice. There are 1,300 credit card brands available
in the United Kingdom, offering a range of different rates, fees and complex terms and
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consumers.66 Note that as in the case of SOTs, socially harmful
complexity would not disappear even if many informed consumers
existed because informed consumers are not particularly harmed by
complexity. 
As shown in Part II, competition would often have a negligible
deterrent effect against artificial complexity of standard-form
contracts. Hence this technique, like SOTs, should be strictly
scrutinized by courts.
E. Summary
The following table summarizes the welfare concerns stemming
from the four oppressive techniques.
TABLE 1: WELFARE CONCERNS FROM THE OPPRESSIVE TECHNIQUES
Inefficient 
Allocation of
Risks
Inefficient
Contracting
Inefficient 
Noncontracting
Efficiently
Bringing
Consumers
on Board
Unfair
TOT yes yes 
(uninformed)
yes 
(informed)
no yes
SOT yes 
(uninformed)
yes 
(uninformed)
no yes yes
SBT no no yes
(uninformed)
yes no
Complexity yes 
(uninformed)
yes
(uninformed)
yes
(uninformed)
yes yes
conditions.” Nina Montagu-Smith, Lay Cards on the Table, Nationwide Tells Rivals,
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 1, 2002, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/borrowing/
creditcards/2832161/Lay-cards-on-the-table-Nationwide-tells-rivals.html.
66. See Bar-Gill, supra note 15, at 1106; Gilo & Porat, supra note 9, at 997-98. 
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II. COMPETITION OVER CONTRACTS AND THE INFORMATION GAP
In Part I, we presented four oppressive techniques used by
suppliers in standard-form contracts. We explored suppliers’
possible motivations in employing these techniques and discussed
the possible policy concerns stemming from each technique. In Part
I, we purposely ignored the impact of competition. In this Part of the
Article, we introduce competition into the discussion. We explore
the extent to which competition over contracts can contribute to
closing the gap of information between suppliers and their unin-
formed consumers. This is a crucial question because the oppressive
techniques could not be inefficient or unfair without an information
gap. Hence competition’s ability to close the information gap should
be a central consideration in evaluating whether a particular
oppressive technique is efficient and fair, and, accordingly, whether
it warrants the court’s intervention in the standard-form contract.
Of course, for competition over contracts to exist, competition over
price, or at least competition over quality, must be shown to exist.
For example, if a supplier who uses a TOT is a monopolist—the only
supplier in his market—his product or service faces no competition,
so there is no competition with regard to his contract either.
Competition might also be lacking altogether when there are only
a few suppliers in the market—an oligopolistic market—and the
market is susceptible to collusion.67 In a market prone to tacit or
explicit collusion, suppliers might also collude over the imposition
of oppressive terms. In what follows, we assume that the supplier’s
market is competitive enough to foster competition over price and
quality, and we focus on the question of whether and when competi-
tion over contracts exists.
Competition over contracts can inform consumers who were
previously uninformed.68 When consumers are informed, suppliers
67. See, e.g., TIROLE, supra note 44, at 240 (showing when competitors could collude, even
tacitly, and what market conditions foster such behavior); see also F.M. SCHERER & DAVID
ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 235 (3d ed. 1990).
68. See supra note 9. But see Ezra Friedman, Competition and Unconscionability 2 (May
2009) (unpublished paper presented at Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n, on file with authors),
available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/Friedman%20paper.pdf (claiming that a
more competitive market may be more prone to exploitation because firms then earn less
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do not want to place inefficient terms in the fine print of their
contracts.69 The same is true when consumers are uninformed, but
there is a credible threat of competition over contracts, which could
inform them. This would suffice to deter suppliers from hiding
inefficient or unfair terms in their standard-form contracts. Hence,
in our framework, competition over contracts involves suppliers’
credible threats to actively expose each other’s oppressive tech-
niques, thereby informing uninformed consumers.70 After all, if
suppliers have already exhausted price and quality competition, and
a supplier wishes to raise its market share at the expense of other
suppliers, he may wish to find hidden flaws in his rival’s contracts
and make them salient to consumers. As we shall see below,
however, this particular form of competition does not always exist.
A. How Can Competition over Contracts Close the Information
Gap?
Suppose the market in which a supplier operates is competitive.
How can competition the supplier faces help inform consumers
about the supplier’s oppressive techniques, thereby deterring the
supplier from employing inefficient and unfair terms in his contract?
In this Section we answer this question. In sum, it all depends on
whether competitive tension among rivals in the market triggers not
only competition over price or quality, but also competition over
contracts; only then would suppliers be effectively deterred from
using inefficient and unfair techniques in their standard-form
contracts. 
In the meantime, we purposely ignore special factors, explored in
detail in Part II.B below, which could stand in the way of competi-
tion closing the information gap. In this Section, we show that even
before considering these special factors, the effects of competition
on the information gap crucially depend on the type of oppressive
money on informed consumers than in a noncompetitive market). Friedman takes the
naiveness of consumers as a given, however. In our framework, in a competitive market,
suppliers may want to steal market share by educating consumers.
69. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
70. Absent such competition, standard-form contracts could be regulated to make their
terms more salient. Cf. Mann, supra note 64, at 927-28 (proposing to foster competition among
credit card issuers by standardizing most of the terms offered to consumers). 
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technique used by the supplier. Let us examine these effects sepa-
rately for each of the four oppressive techniques.
1. Traditional Oppressive Terms
Consider a supplier (“Supplier X”) employing the TOT described
in Example 1: his standard-form contract contains a provision in the
fine print, according to which “the supplier bears no liability for a
delay in delivery of up to ninety days.” But now suppose that the
supplier is not the only one in his market. He faces intense compe-
tition from several rival suppliers who sell TV sets too. Intense
competition means that if a supplier is offering consumers either a
relatively high price or a relatively poor deal, competing suppliers
can and will offer either lower prices or better deals.71 But if
consumers remain in the dark as to Supplier X’s TOT hidden in the
fine print, simply offering them a deal without such a TOT would
not suffice in order to persuade them to switch to a competing
supplier. Hence competing suppliers would often want to let
consumers know about Supplier X’s hidden TOT in order to entice
them away from Supplier X.72 This is a simple case in which
competition could close the information gap between Supplier X and
his consumers. 
At times, consumers might learn of a supplier’s inefficient or
unfair TOT from sources other than the supplier’s rivals. In
particular, consumer-oriented websites could provide some informa-
tion regarding oppressive terms in consumer contracts in certain
industries.73 In appropriate cases, when an industry is under the
71. By “intense competition” we do not necessarily mean competition that drives prices
all the way down to marginal cost (the cost of supplying the marginal unit). We acknowledge
that in real life, in most markets, competition is not that perfect. See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-
COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 387-400 (1995);
TIROLE, supra note 44, at 209. Subject to this caveat, we assume that competition is intense
enough to induce suppliers to try and fight each other for market share. In other words, we
assume that competitive tension is too intense to sustain tacit or express collusion among
suppliers.
72. For examples of such behavior, see infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
73. For example, ConsumerReports.org reported a survey of contracts regarding extended
warranties for cars and recommended that consumers pay attention to “exclusions and
limitations” in the fine print, stressing that in order to learn about them, “you need to delve
into the contract.” ConsumerReports.org, How They Work: Terms and Coverage, http://www.
consumerreports.org/cro/cars/new-cars/buying-advice/extended-warranties-4-08/how-they-
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close scrutiny of reliable watchdogs who are committed to protect-
ing consumers, a supplier could claim that the threat of such
exposure would suffice in order to deter him from including
inefficient or unfair TOTs in his contracts, much like competition
over contracts would.
There are various examples of firms criticizing terms hidden in
the fine print of their rivals’ contracts. In its commercials, Capital
One, a rewards credit card firm, mocks competing rewards credit
card companies for hiding various limitations to receiving rewards
in their fine print, such as minimum card use requirements,
expiration and inalienability provisions, and blackout dates during
which rewards cannot be used.74 Nationwide, a provider of loans,
mortgages, and credit cards, has emphasized that its rivals’ fine
print contains “hidden features” such as the paying off of the
cheapest debt first. Nationwide stressed in an Internet publication,
“We think that is unfair, so we allow customers to pay off the most
expensive debt first.”75 In a TV commercial, Nationwide highlights
work/how-they-work-continued/extended-warranties-how-they-work-terms-and-coverage.htm
(last visited Sept. 29, 2010). See also Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of ‘Opportunity to Read’ in
Contract, 5 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1, 23-26 (2008) (proposing nonlegal approaches to making the
contract terms more transparent by building on market devices such as ratings and labeling).
In addition, independent bloggers or industry analysts occasionally highlight the existence
of harsh terms in the fine print of particular suppliers. For example, telecom analyst Bruce
Kushnick has revealed allegedly oppressive terms in the fine print regarding the use of
iPhones. What’s Hidden in the iPhone’s ‘Fine Print’?, http://directorblue.blogspot.com/
2007/07/whats-hidden-in-iphones-fine-print.html (July 9, 2007, 20:01 EST); see also New
Networks Institute, What’s Hidden in AT&T’s ‘Fine Print’?, http://www.newnetworks.com/
attwirelessfineprint.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2010). Also, blogger Ken Fisher has alleged
that a term in AT&T’s contract for Internet connection is oppressive. Posting of Ken Fisher
to Ars Technica, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2007/10/att-vows-to-use-terms-of-
service-for-good-not-censorship.ars (Oct. 2, 2007, 11:44 EST).
74. See capitalonecommunity, Smores, YouTube (Sept. 24, 2008), http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=WAGJkRh8rXA (Capital One commercial implicitly comparing rival’s fine print
to living hell while Capital One causes hell to freeze over with the slogan “Capital One: takes
all of the surprises out of reward mile redemption ... no hidden fees, no expiration, no
blackouts”); lexijourden, Capital One Commercial, YouTube (Aug. 10, 2008), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=Kxpx4HnPcTs (Capital One commercial in which limitations are
allegorized through a tooth fairy quoting the fine print explaining why a child receives merely
a nickel for her tooth); MSUFan48152, Capital One Commercial, YouTube (Apr. 23, 2007),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFn4cxy05HA (Capital One commercial in which reward
limitations are allegorized through a princess kissing a frog and receiving a rat instead, who
quotes the fine print).
75. Montagu-Smith, supra note 65 (quoting Natalie Woodroofe, spokeswoman for
Nationwide). 
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how its rivals in the mortgage market hide a “higher lending
charge,” or “HLC,” in their contracts, which kicks in when the
amount borrowed exceeds a given percentage of the value of the
property.76 Broadband Internet service provider PlusNet criticized
its competitors, and specifically its rival Tiscali, for misleading
customers into believing they had “unlimited connectivity”; however,
the fine print of their standard-form contracts includes a “fair
usage” clause that is designed to ease congestion at peak traffic
times but effectively serves as a cap on connectivity.77 Custom TV
Ads, a company which offers TV advertising for small businesses,
attacked the oppressive fine print of its rivals that sell automated
ads.78 Wireless carrier Alltel broadcast a TV commercial criticizing
rivals AT&T, T-Mobile, Sprint, and Verizon, in which the compa-
nies’ representatives each wear a T-shirt emblazoned with the name
of the competing carrier, for their fine print preventing customers
from changing their wireless plans without extending their
contracts.79 Virgin Mobile too has extensively published critiques
76. See plentyspam, Nationwide Annoying Bank Manager No HLC, YouTube (May 23,
2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Lgbs6A2glk (Nationwide commercial featuring a
couple frustrated by the “HLC” provision while the rival bank’s representative tries to distract
them). For a definition of an “HLC,” see Home.co.uk, Mortgage Glossary: Higher Lending
Charge, http://www.home.co.uk/guides/mortgage_glossary.htm?hlc (last visited Sept. 29,
2010). See also Iver Heath, Nationwide Building Society advert, YouTube (Sept. 8, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qFZV3y-p_NY (Nationwide commercial criticizing rivals for
at first offering low introductory rates to “hoike people in” and then exploiting them with
larger hidden fees).
77. See David Meyer, PlusNet Accuses Broadband Rivals of Misleading Customers,
ZDNET.CO.UK, Sept. 1, 2006, http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/networking/2006/09/01/plusnet-
accuses-broadband-rivals-of-misleading-customers-39282114/. 
78. See Custom TV Ads, http://customtvds.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2010) (Custom TV
Ads Internet website calling consumers who choose rivals “suckers” due to rivals’ oppressive
fine print).
79. See AlltelTk, Alltel Wireless-TK, YouTube (Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=E1h0KaaOkFM. Following Alltel’s campaign, Verizon Wireless and Sprint
Nextel announced that they too would alter their contracts to enable customers to switch
plans without extending the contract’s period. See Matt Kapko, VZW Sues Alltel over Ad
Claims—Fight Centers on Ability To Change Plans Without Impacting Contracts, RCR
WIRELESS NEWS, Jan. 7, 2008, at 4; see also AlltelFan, Alltel Food Court Commercial,
YouTube (Sept. 26, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xgnSgW-xz3c (Alltel commercial
highlighting how customers of its four rivals—represented again by the four representatives
—are “stuck” with contracts that do not match their individual needs).
2010] VIEWING UNCONSCIONABILITY 167
about its rivals’ fine print, including “hidden fees,”80 charging for
services the customer does not need,81 and lock-in periods.82
2. Selectively Oppressive Terms
Consider now the SOT of Example 3 above, in which Supplier X’s
standard-form contract provides that “the supplier bears no liability
for a delay in delivery of up to ninety days, unless the consumer asks
otherwise at the time of purchase and fills out the requisite forms.”
Suppose now that Supplier X faces intense competition from other
TV suppliers. To what extent would other suppliers, who vigorously
compete with Supplier X, have the incentive to inform consumers
about Supplier X’s SOT? Unlike the case of a TOT, with an SOT,
Supplier X’s informed consumers, who have no particular problem
carefully reading the fine print and filling out the forms, are not
subject to the oppressive term. When the transaction costs incurred
by informed consumers to escape the oppressive term are negligible,
competing suppliers cannot entice such informed consumers away
from Supplier X by highlighting the existence of the SOT. A
competing supplier can presumably only steal Supplier X’s potential
uninformed consumers—those who are subject to the oppressive
term. But when a competing supplier reveals the existence of the
SOT to them, they may well buy Supplier X’s product, now that they
80. See Maryanna Lewyckyj, Cellphone Fee Furor; System Access Charges Subject of
Lawsuit, TORONTO SUN, Mar. 5, 2005, at 48 (quoting Richard Branson, founder of Virgin
Mobile, saying that his rival cellular carriers have been hiding fees in their fine print); see also
LitigiousOne, Virgin Mobile Cell Phone Scam, Part 1, YouTube (Apr. 11, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sWMsZLk0mfc (news bulletin describing the PR strategy
behind the launching of Virgin Mobile, featuring “Nothing to Hide,” “no contracts,” and “no
hidden fees”). Also, Bell Mobility, a Canadian rival of Rogers, the network associated with
iPhones, has broadcast a commercial criticizing the fees hidden in rivals’ contracts. The ad
features customers of rival cell phone companies as victims of a crime. TubeMe6969, Bell
Mobility Canada No Fees, YouTube (Sept. 29, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=IS4QMYZhcI8. Indeed, it has been reported that Rogers uses oppressive and unfair
techniques in its fine print, and reporters named Bell Mobility as the carrier most likely to
feed off the exposure of Rogers’ behavior. See Shaw, supra note 65.
81. See piper164, Don’t Get Hosed—Virgin Mobile, YouTube (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=-4aNgTXjf5c (Virgin Mobile commercial suggesting customers should
not have to pay for basics like voicemail and call display). 
82. See kobus123, Virgin Mobile South Africa, YouTube (June 26, 2006), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=nfjczPVyddI (Virgin Mobile ad with the slogan “Had enough? Get
Virgin Mobile. No ripoffs, no lock-ins.”).
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know from the competing supplier how to easily relieve themselves
from Supplier X’s oppressive term. Hence competing suppliers might
be unsure how many consumers they can really steal from Supplier
X by closing the consumers’ information gap, and this lack of
certainty could stifle their incentive to do so.83
Accordingly, competition has a weak deterrent effect on Supplier
X’s incentive to include an inefficient or unfair SOT in his contract.84
3. Selectively Beneficial Terms 
Will suppliers want to make their rivals’ SBTs salient to consum-
ers? Suppose Supplier X adopts the SBT mentioned in Example 4.
His fine print provides a special discount for consumers who fill out
a certain form and mail it back to the supplier. Will competing
suppliers, engaged in vigorous competition with Supplier X, have
83. The situation could be different when the transaction costs required in order to
neutralize the oppressive term are nonnegligible. If, for example, filling out the forms in
Example 3 is time consuming, a competing supplier could steal more of Supplier X’s
consumers by highlighting that when buying his TVs, no oppressive terms exist in the
contract and thus no time-consuming forms are necessary. 
84. See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 9, at 507 (showing that competition cannot deter
suppliers from using avoidable add-ons, which were shown above to resemble SOTs). To be
sure, at times competing suppliers could derive certain long-term benefits from closing
consumers’ information gaps as to Supplier X’s SOT. First, if for some reason the rival
supplier is not able to discriminate in favor of informed consumers (as the SOT enables
Supplier X to do), the rival may want to expose the SOT in order to erode Supplier X’s ability
to discriminate. Second, emphasizing the existence of Supplier X’s SOT to consumers could
erode Supplier X’s profits, leaving him fewer funds to invest in improving his product. Still,
these subtle long-run competitive motivations cannot be counted upon to guarantee the rival’s
incentives to expose the SOT. Criticizing SOTs might become more likely when the SOT binds
the consumer to his supplier and makes it hard for him to switch to a competing supplier. For
example, U.K. telecom company British Telecom has criticized its rival TalkTalk, alleging
that its “customer agreements are unfair because they include a ‘negative opt-out term’ which
allows TalkTalk to move customers [to its own network] without their permission.” See
Damian Reece, BT Accuses TalkTalk of ‘Shady’ Sales Practice, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 26, 2005,
at 49, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/bt-accuses-talktalk-of-
shady-sales-practice-484948.html. A British Telecom executive stated, “These clauses are
unfair on customers and are a shady practice. I am surprised they would ever be considered
by a major industry operator.” Id. The criticized term is an SOT because, according to
TalkTalk’s contract, a consumer can ask, in writing, that TalkTalk not unilaterally move his
telephone line to TalkTalk’s network. Finally, when impartial third parties, such as
consumer-oriented websites, closely scrutinize the supplier’s market, such parties can also
deter suppliers from using inefficient or unfair SOTs. See supra note 73 and accompanying
text. 
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an incentive to highlight to consumers the existence of Supplier
X’s SBT? The analysis here is similar to that of SOTs: First, the
competing supplier would not necessarily succeed in enticing
Supplier X’s informed consumers away because they already enjoy
the special discount from Supplier X. Second, the rival supplier
might not even be able to entice uninformed consumers away
from Supplier X because the uninformed consumers, following the
rival’s advertisement about Supplier X’s SBT, might simply choose
Supplier X’s product and fill out the requisite forms.85 As in the case
of SOTs, then, there are no substantial benefits from exposing a
rival’s SBT.86 
4. Complexity
Suppose now that Supplier X is the provider of multichannel TV
and Internet mentioned in Example 5, offering complex contracts,
the value of which is hard for consumers to assess. Can a rival of
Supplier X gain from closing the consumers’ information gap caused
by this complexity? The answer depends on what Supplier X is
trying to accomplish by using complexity. Naturally, if complexity
is used to disguise a TOT, rival suppliers may want to help consum-
ers see through the complexity and realize the existence of Supplier
X’s TOT. As in the case of highlighting the existence of any TOT, the
rival supplier could, in this way, steal consumers from Supplier X.
Suppose now, on the other hand, that Supplier X’s complexity is
not used to hide a TOT but rather to facilitate discrimination by
Supplier X, or to facilitate the application of SOTs or SBTs. Here
85. As with SOTs, a rival supplier could try to attract consumers by showing them that
they can receive the same special discount with a smaller hassle. He could lure informed
consumers from Supplier X if the transaction costs that consumers need to bear for receiving
the discount from Supplier X are significant. 
86. Edlin, supra note 52, at 538-39 (showing how entry into the market does not alleviate
the price-increasing effect of price-matching policies). Price matching—promising to match
a rival’s lower price—bears some resemblance to SBTs because it too enables suppliers to
discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers. As in the case of SOTs, in certain
cases there could be long-run, more subtle profits derived by a competing supplier from
highlighting Supplier X’s SBT. See supra note 84. Such subtle competitive drives cannot be
counted upon, however, to close the information gap. Also, when impartial third parties, such
as consumer-oriented websites, closely scrutinize the supplier’s market, such parties could
deter suppliers from using inefficient or unfair SBTs. See supra note 73 and accompanying
text.
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rival suppliers’ incentives to neutralize the complexity and empha-
size this fact could be weaker. Supplier X’s informed and sophisti-
cated consumers may well be satisfied with Supplier X because they
know their way through Supplier X’s contractual maze. Further-
more, they may be subsidized by Supplier X’s uninformed and less
sophisticated consumers, who end up with worse deals.87 Finally,
Supplier X’s uninformed consumers would not necessarily switch to
Supplier X’s rivals because, after being made aware of the complex-
ity, many of them might be able to avoid the discrimination they
were exposed to by Supplier X.
B. Factors Preventing Competition from Closing the Information
Gap
As we demonstrated in Part II.A, competition has the potential to
close the information gap between suppliers and consumers, mainly
when suppliers use TOTs. With the other oppressive techniques,
competition over contracts is expected to be minor or nonexistent.
In this Section we discuss several factors that may prevent competi-
tion from closing the information gap even with respect to TOTs.
Each of these factors could cause suppliers not to inform consumers
about the TOTs used by their rivals.
1. Backfiring Competition
One reason suppliers might avoid criticizing their rivals’ oppres-
sive techniques is that by doing so they would expose themselves to
consumers’ negative reactions toward their own products or
contracts,88 or to the retaliation of their rivals.89 We refer to these
backfiring effects as consumers’ backfiring on the product, consum-
87. To be sure, if a rival supplier offers consumers a simple deal with terms equivalent
to those informed consumers could receive from Supplier X, they may nevertheless switch to
the rival supplier, so as to relieve themselves from the transaction costs. Also, in certain
circumstances, rivals may have long-run incentives to dissipate Supplier X’s ability to
discriminate (via complexity) or his ability to make profits in this fashion. See supra note 84.
Finally, when impartial parties, such as consumer-oriented websites, closely scrutinize the
supplier’s market, such parties could simplify complex contracts for the benefit of consumers.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
88. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
89. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
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ers’ backfiring on the contract, and rivals’ backfiring. To illustrate,
suppose that in Example 2, involving the Dry Cleaner, the TOT
limiting the Dry Cleaner’s liability for damage to the customer’s
clothes was adopted by Dry Cleaner X and is inefficient. Dry
Cleaner X’s competitors are therefore supposedly expected to expose
the TOT and make consumers understand its drawback: a high risk
of exposure to nonrecoverable losses. But despite the existence of
intense competition in Dry Cleaner X’s market, competing dry
cleaners may avoid exposing the TOT and its adverse effect on
consumers because this exposition may backfire on them. Consum-
ers’ backfiring on the product occurs because by illuminating Dry
Cleaner X’s TOT, a rival supplier may create the impression in
consumers’ minds that dry cleaning as such may result in harm to
consumers’ clothes. Absent such exposition by rival dry cleaners, the
possibility of damage to their clothes, as the existence of the TOT
itself, may not have been salient to consumers.90 Once consumers
become aware of the possible harm, their consumption of dry
cleaning services, including the services of the criticizing dry
cleaner, may go down. 
The second type of backfiring, consumers’ backfiring on the
contract, can occur when a rival dry cleaner’s exposition of Dry
Cleaner X’s TOT sharpens the consumers’ attention. They become
more averse to exclusionary clauses used by dry cleaners in general,
including the criticizing dry cleaner’s exclusionary clauses. If a dry
cleaner criticizes Dry Cleaner X’s exclusionary clause, he too would
probably have to stop using exclusionary clauses, because his
campaign against Dry Cleaner X’s oppressive clauses would make
consumers more sensitive to such clauses.91 
The third type of backfiring, rivals’ backfiring, takes place when
Supplier X’s TOT is criticized by a competing supplier, and Supplier
X is driven to retaliate. By definition, criticizing a rival’s contract
90. See Korobkin, supra note 17, at 1230 (“For a product attribute to be salient to buyers,
the attribute must capture the limited attention of those buyers.”). 
91. Consumers’ backfiring on the product and on the contract are stronger the longer
suppliers expect to operate in the market. When such backfiring occurs, its damage is usually
long-lived. If a rival supplier has a TOT similar to Supplier X’s TOT and this supplier
criticizes Supplier X’s TOT, the criticizing supplier would probably need to stop using such
a TOT for an indefinite period. Similarly, if such criticism reduces the demand for the product,
the reduction in demand could last for a considerable period.
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involves “negative advertising.” That is, rather than praising his
own product, a supplier has something bad to say or imply about his
rival’s contracts with consumers. Such negative advertising could be
costly to the criticizing supplier because it usually invites retaliation
by the criticized supplier.92 Retaliation against the criticizing
supplier is expected to be harsher the more severe the critique.93
While the threat of consumer backfiring on the product varies
from case to case, and is at times compelling, suppliers’ fear of
rivals’ backfiring always exists to a certain extent. Furthermore,
consumers’ backfiring on the contract exists whenever the criticizing
supplier himself employs oppressive techniques similar to the
criticized one. In a market in which competition over price and
quality is strong, however, consumers’ backfiring on the contract
and rivals’ backfiring are not expected, in and of themselves, to
stop suppliers from criticizing their rivals’ TOTs. In general, any
competitive move by a supplier involves the need to become com-
petitive himself, as in the case of consumers’ backfiring on the
contract, and involves, to a certain extent, retaliation by the
suppliers’ rivals, who wish to compete back, as in the case of rivals’
backfiring. Nevertheless, in a competitive market, these two forms
of backfiring are usually presumed not to block competition.
2. Attracting Unwanted Consumers
A supplier would hesitate to expose his rival’s oppressive terms
if he expected many of the consumers attracted by this exposition to
be unwanted consumers.94 Unwanted consumers are characterized
92. See Ming-Jer Chen & Danny Miller, Competitive Attack, Retaliation, and Performance:
An Expectancy-Valence Framework, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 85, 86 (1994) (“If a firm’s actions
represent a threat that is obvious, easy to match, and significant, its alert rivals will be
motivated to counter that attack, and thus perhaps, to negate its potential benefits.”).
Retaliation could be a rational strategy when the criticized supplier wishes to show consumers
that he is not worse than the criticizing supplier or when the criticized supplier wishes to win
back market share enticed away from him by the criticizing supplier. Chen and Miller claim
that “[a]n action is more likely to evoke a response if it is easy to imitate, that is, if it can be
countered simply, economically and without much organizational disruption.” Id. at 88. 
93. Chen and Miller examined the aviation industry in the United States and concluded
that the more visible, more central, and more easily imitated attacks by criticizing firms
provoked more responses from the criticized. Id. at 97.
94. See supra note 17.
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by the fact that they are so costly to serve that, if possible, a
supplier would prefer not to serve them at all. 
Unwanted consumers typically exist in markets for services, long-
term contracts, sales of products with supplier warranties, and so
forth, where serving certain types of customers is prohibitively
expensive.95 To illustrate, consider the example given in the
Introduction of a computer manufacturer who employs a clause in
his contracts exonerating himself from liability for losses caused
by some of the computer’s components. Assume now that these
components malfunction half of the time due to the consumer’s
carelessness. A rival computer supplier criticizing this TOT must
take into account the fact that the first consumers attracted to the
exposition of the TOT are the careless consumers, whose expected
losses are relatively high. For such consumers, the TOT is especially
harmful. Naturally, the criticizing supplier could not employ a sim-
ilar exclusionary clause in his contract. Hence he may rightly fear
that many of the consumers he would entice away would be “high
risk,” and therefore “high cost,” consumers. This would weaken his
incentives to expose his rival’s TOT in the first place. 
A similar effect could deter competitors from criticizing the Dry
Cleaner’s TOT in Example 2. The first consumers to leave the Dry
Cleaner after they become aware of the TOT are those whose clothes
are more vulnerable to damage or more expensive. A rival dry
cleaner who does not limit his liability might hesitate to entice away
such consumers, whose expected harm from dry cleaning is on
average relatively high.96
95. Suppliers often try to get rid of high-cost consumers. See, e.g., Lucy Barrett, How
Admen Can Spot the ‘Timewaster.com,’ MARKETING WEEK, Nov. 4, 1999, available at http://
www.mad.co.uk/Main/News/Disciplines/Digital/Articles/7f1953a8adc1428e8de91dcf36c7a7
dd/How-admen-can-spot-the-‘timewastercom’.html (reporting how London’s top advertising
agencies turn down new Internet ventures due to their high insolvency rate); Alisa Bralove,
Screening Clients Can Prevent Attorneys from Taking on Problem Clients, DAILY RECORD, Aug.
15, 2003, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4183/is_20030815/ai_n10057488/
pg_1 (quoting attorneys who advise their colleagues on how to identify and get rid of
unwanted clients).
96. For another example, consider Internet access provider AT&T’s TOT, enabling it, at
the time, to “immediately terminate ... your Service, any Member ID, electronic mail address,
IP address, Universal Resource Locator or domain name used by you, without notice, for
conduct that AT&T believes ... tends to damage the name or reputation of AT&T, or its
parents, affiliates and subsidiaries.” Fisher, supra note 73. Naturally, no rival of AT&T would
wish to highlight the existence of this TOT because the customers who care about such a term
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3. Benefit Externalization 
As Parts II.B.1-2 show, at times the criticizing supplier bears
costs when he exposes a rival’s oppressive technique, particularly
due to backfiring of the three above-mentioned types, and the
attraction of unwanted consumers. At the same time, the benefits
of exposing a rival’s TOT could be shared by many of the other
suppliers in the market, particularly those who do not use similar
TOTs themselves. Consumers concerned with their supplier’s ex-
posed TOT might well leave their supplier in favor of another
supplier who does not use such a TOT and might not necessarily
transfer to the criticizing supplier. If the criticizing supplier bears
all costs when criticizing his rival and does not receive all of the
benefits, his incentive to do so will be diminished.97 Moreover, each
of the suppliers who do not use TOTs may prefer to wait until
another supplier among them decides to bear the costs of criticizing
their rival.98 Consequently, it may be that none of them ends up
engaging in such criticism.
4. Irresponsive Consumers
In order for competitive pressure to close the information gap
between consumers and a supplier, a large enough portion of
consumers needs to be responsive to the information the rival
supplier is trying to convey to them.99 To be sure, not all consumers
need to respond to such information. It is sufficient that a critical
mass of them might leave the supplier following the rival’s adver-
tisements in order to effectively deter the supplier from employing
the TOT. Such a critical mass of responsive consumers may not
exist, however. In certain cases, consumers are not only ignorant of
and who would likely transfer to the criticizing rival would be those most inclined to harm the
reputation of their Internet provider. Fortunately, in this case the TOT was revealed by a
journalist. Id.
97. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
98. To be sure, some of the costs created when a TOT is exposed are suffered by all rivals
and not only by the criticizing supplier. Such are the costs involved in consumers’ backfiring
on the product and on the contract, and in attracting unwanted consumers. A disproportionate
part of these costs, however, is born by the criticizing supplier. The costs of rivals’ backfiring
are born exclusively by the criticizing supplier.
99. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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the TOT hidden in their contract but also indifferent to adver-
tising by rival suppliers who try to emphasize its existence. After
all, uninformed consumers are often those who are not willing to
expend the transaction costs needed in order to read the fine print
in their contracts. They may be equally unwilling to absorb and
verify a rival supplier’s claim that their contract is oppressive. Take
the TOT of Example 1, for instance, in which Supplier X relieves
himself of liability for late delivery of a TV set. If a rival supplier
advertises, in written leaflets put in mailboxes or via e-mail, that
Supplier X’s contract includes a TOT in the fine print, consumers
who do not read the fine print may also fail to read and absorb
such an advertisement. In order to induce them to respond, the
rival supplier would have to expend more resources on advertising.
For example, he would have to emphasize Supplier X’s TOT in
television or radio commercials. But these forms of advertising are
more costly, and therefore could be less profitable for the criticizing
supplier. The criticizing supplier may well prefer to use the scarce
and expensive advertising time he has purchased to convey infor-
mation that consumers are more likely to respond to.
The situation might be different when suppliers use sales
representatives who have direct contact with consumers. Such sales
representatives could try to convince consumers to buy their
company’s product or service by exposing rival suppliers’ TOTs and
emphasizing how the rivals’ contracts are unfair or draconian.
Consumers’ responses to such efforts might at times be stronger,
making the efforts worth their while.100 Also, consumers might be
more responsive in cases in which their deal with the supplier is a
larger one.101
100. See Arvind Rangaswamy, Prabhak Ant Sinha & Andris Zoltners, An Integration
Model-Based Approach for Sales Force Structuring, 9 MARKETING SCI. 279, 281 (1990)
(examining the role of sales representatives and pointing out that on the one hand, a short
purchase cycle and a competitive environment support a constant presence of sales
representatives; on the other hand, customers view the presence of sales representatives as
an inconvenience).
101. See infra Part III.B.1.c.
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C. Sufficiency of a Competitive Threat
As noted, for competition over contracts to deter suppliers from
using inefficient or unfair TOTs, rivals need not actually inform
consumers about such TOTs. The threat that rivals may do so often
suffices in order to provide such deterrence.102 When a supplier
considers employing an inefficient or unfair TOT, he balances the
gains such a TOT might grant him with the expected losses from
having rivals later criticize his TOTs. Even if there were only a 20
percent chance of rivals criticizing his TOT, such criticism might
involve such a large expected loss that it would outweigh the gains
the supplier expected to make from the TOT. This implies that even
in cases in which one or more of the four factors, discussed in Part
II.B, partially hinders competition over contracts, the probable
threat of such competition could suffice to remove inefficient or
unfair TOTs.
It should be stressed that the supplier’s expected losses from
rivals’ criticism are typically long-lived. When the supplier’s inef-
ficient or unfair TOT is exposed, many consumers may leave him in
favor of rival suppliers. Even if the supplier stops using the TOT,
consumers might not trust him anymore.
102. It is well known that when a market is competitive enough, the mere threat of
competition assures competitive prices and good quality. See, e.g., TIROLE, supra note 44, at
101 (showing that in a competitive market, product quality will be optimal from the point of
view of the average consumer in equilibrium, while a different level of quality would not
evolve in equilibrium in the first place). This is why antitrust courts and agencies approve or
disapprove of a transaction, such as a merger among competitors, on the basis of the number
of viable competitors in the market. If the number and capacity of such rivals is large enough,
the merger is approved because the threat of competition is counted on to produce competitive
prices and quality. See, e.g., Irving Bank Corp. v. Bd. of Governors, 845 F.2d 1035, 1041-42
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (approving a merger among banks due to the low concentration of the
market); 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,558 (Sept. 10, 1992)
(“Mergers resulting in unconcentrated markets are unlikely to have adverse competitive
effects and ordinarily require no further analysis.”); Laura L. Stephens, Nonprofit Hospital
Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Closing an Antitrust Loophole, 75 B.U. L. REV. 477,
500 (1995) (“In analyzing mergers, economists assume that market concentration and market
performance (i.e., price competition) tend to vary inversely.”). 
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III. HOW SHOULD COURTS HANDLE TRADITIONAL OPPRESSIVE
TERMS? 
In this Part of the Article, we propose to courts how to implement
the market-based approach and when to intervene in standard-form
consumer contracts based on our conclusions from Parts I and II.
As demonstrated in Part II, competition over contracts serves as
a weak deterrent against the use of SOTs, SBTs, and artificial
complexity. Accordingly, these three techniques deserve special
scrutiny, and courts should be particularly suspicious of them.
This result is striking because as to date courts have virtually
ignored these techniques. Yet as Part I shows, they potentially pose
significant efficiency and fairness concerns. As we have shown else-
where,103 a host of legal tools exists to cope with the welfare con-
cerns stemming from SBTs. As to SOTs and artificial complexity, it
would be worthwhile to explore how the unconscionability doctrine
could be applied to such practices and what other legal tools might
be available to mitigate their social harm.
Unlike in the cases of SOTs, SBTs, and artificial complexity,
where competition cannot be counted upon to prevent their social
harm, Part II shows how at times competition—or even the threat
of competition—can deter suppliers from using inefficient or unfair
TOTs. Part III provides courts with guidelines for applying the
proposed market-based approach to TOTs. We start by presenting
courts’ current methodology for assessing TOTs. We then propose
how courts might dramatically change their existing methodology
by incorporating the insights of Part II into the analysis of TOTs.104
103. See Gilo & Porat, supra note 9, at 1020-30.
104. For a different approach advocating various degrees of market regulation, see Baird,
supra note 24, at 947 (stating that “[i]n a mass marketplace in which there is little dickering
or negotiating, legal rules should focus ... on ensuring the smooth operation of the market as
a whole”). 
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A. Courts’ Existing Attitude Toward TOTs and the Proposed
Change
Courts utilize various legal tools to deal with TOTs.105 At times,
courts conclude that TOTs have not been accepted by consumers in
the first place and therefore are not part of the contract.106 On other
occasions, courts interpret TOTs in favor of consumers, applying the
rule of interpretation against the draftsman.107 Another way courts
tackle TOTs is to find them unenforceable under public policy
considerations.108 At times, courts impose liability for misleading
advertising, when a supplier publicly advertises only the beneficial,
salient parts of his product, hiding the parts that make the sup-
plier’s real deal less attractive.109 But the most familiar tool courts
employ in dealing with TOTs is the doctrine of unconscionability.110
105. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 456-60 (2002) (discussing various legal tools to handle
harsh terms in standard-form contracts).
106. Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1267 (9th Cir. 2006) (deciding that the
franchisee did not agree to the arbitration clause, and thus it was not a part of the
agreement); C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 1975)
(refusing to enforce an escape clause in an insurance policy because the clause “was never
read to or by plaintiff’s personnel, nor was the substance explained by defendant’s agent”); 1
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 562 (3d ed. 2004) (A “judicial technique
in dealing with standard-forms is to refuse to hold a party to an offensive term on the ground
that, although the writing may plainly have been an offer, the term was not one that an
uninitiated reader ought reasonably to have understood to be a part of that offer.”). 
107. See, e.g., United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 210 (1970) (applying the rule of
interpretation against the draftsman to a construction contract); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981) (“In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a
promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates
against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.”). 
108. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 679-80 (Cal.
2000) (noting that courts employ “general contract law principles” in refusing to enforce
arbitration provisions that are “unconscionable or contrary to public policy”). 
109. See, e.g., Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 523 F.3d 934, 939-40 (9th Cir. 2008) (ruling
in favor of parents who believed snacks for toddlers called “fruit juice snacks” were healthy
for their children, although the two most prominent ingredients were corn syrup and sugar);
Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 36, 40-41 (Ct. App. 2006) (affirming
a summary judgment imposing liability because the defendant advertised its products as
“Made in U.S.A.,” although components were manufactured outside the United States).
110. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2008) (“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any term
of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable term, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid
any unconscionable result.”). See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 106, at 594-99 (dis-
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According to this doctrine, courts take into account two types of
unconscionability: procedural unconscionability and substantive
unconscionability.111 Procedural unconscionability exists when
consumers are uninformed or when the supplier enjoys a superior
bargaining position.112 In such cases, consumers, as some courts
have maintained, “do not have a meaningful choice.”113 Substantive
unconscionability relates to the harshness of the TOT: the more
oppressive it is, the higher its chances of being struck down.114 
Within procedural unconscionability courts often focus on
whether the individual consumer claiming the application of the
cussing the unconscionability doctrine); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 151-177 (2000).
111. See Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-
Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 854 (2006) (discussing the two forms of
unconscionability); Korobkin, supra note 17, at 1254 (“Courts usually search for ‘substantive
unconscionability’ only when there is evidence of a procedural defect in the bargaining
process. Without evidence of ‘procedural unconscionability,’ courts generally defer completely
to seller-drafted terms.”). See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the
Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967) (discussing both types of
unconscionability and the interrelation between them). 
112. See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Fin. Group, L.L.C. v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 2004)
(“Procedural unconscionability is proved by showing ‘a lack of knowledge, lack of
voluntariness, inconspicuous print, the use of complex legalistic language, disparity in
sophistication or bargaining power of the parties and/or a lack of opportunity to study the
contract and inquire about the contract terms.’” (quoting Russell v. Performance Toyota, Inc.,
826 So. 2d 719, 725 (Miss. 2002))); Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d
376, 381-82 (Ct. App. 2001) (“The procedural element focuses on ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise.’”);
First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Purolator Sec., Inc., 388 N.E.2d 17, 22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (“The
unconscionability doctrine has been applied most often to prevent instances of commercial
sharp practices by parties possessing superior bargaining power.”).
113. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(“Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice
on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party.”); Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 436
(Ct. App. 2004) (“The oppression component arises from an inequality of bargaining power of
the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the
part of the weaker party.”).
114. See, e.g., Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1280 (9th Cir. 2006) (“In other
words, the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable.”
(quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 768 (Cal. 2000)));
Abramson, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 436 (“Substantively unconscionable terms may take various
forms, but may generally be described as unfairly one-sided.” (quoting Little v. Auto Stiegler,
Inc., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 898 (2003))); Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 83 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 348, 353 (Ct. App. 1999) (“‘Substantive unconscionability’ focuses on the terms of the
agreement and whether those terms are ‘so one-sided as to shock the conscience.’”).
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doctrine was informed. For example, a consumer who is not a native
speaker of English might be considered uninformed and his TOT
would be condemned, while English-speaking consumers subject to
the same TOT would be considered informed and their TOTs would
remain valid.115 An extreme case of substantive unconscionability is
reflected in occasions in which a TOT is struck down because of its
very nature. A common example is an exclusionary clause relating
to personal injury, which is considered by the U.C.C. as prima facie
unconscionable.116 At times, even exclusionary clauses concerning
nonbodily harm, such as the one in Example 2 (the Dry Cleaner),
may be considered unconscionable regardless of whether consumers
are informed.117 
In addition to courts conducting case-by-case adjudication,
legislatures in several states have enacted laws prohibiting the
use of certain types of TOTs. For example, several states have
banned suppliers from disclaiming implied warranties of fitness
and merchantability of the product or service.118 In many states,
suppliers are subject to duties of disclosure with respect to certain
terms of the deal, including TOTs, thereby closing the gap of infor-
mation between them and consumers.119 At times suppliers are
required by legislators to disclose clearly to consumers whether they
are providing them with a limited or a full warranty, yet once the
disclosure requirement is met, suppliers are free to provide a limited
warranty.120 
The brief description above suggests that courts take into ac-
count three main considerations when deciding whether to strike
down a TOT: to what extent consumers are informed; the supplier’s
115. See, e.g., Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390, 393-94 (Civ. Ct. 1969)
(holding that a contract was unconscionable because the defendant, due to his poor English,
could not understand that he had waived the implied warranties of fitness and
merchantability). 
116. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2008) (“Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person
in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable.”). 
117. Id. (“Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable.”).
118. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 106, at 611-13 (providing examples of statutes
prohibiting disclaimers of implied warranties). 
119. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 73 (describing how legislatures impose duties of disclosure
on suppliers and arguing that those endeavors are useless). 
120. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2303 (2006) (requiring a supplier who
grants a written warranty to designate it as either a “full” or a “limited” warranty). 
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bargaining power vis-à-vis consumers; and the harshness of the
term in question. Yet it is hard to identify a clear and unified theory
guiding courts when dealing with TOTs.121 
By contrast, the law and economics literature has shown that the
main focus of courts should be on procedural, rather than substan-
tive unconscionability. Even within procedural unconscionability,
only the information gap between suppliers and consumers matters,
rather than suppliers’ superior bargaining power.122 In particular,
when consumers are sufficiently informed, it is safe to assume that
the policy concerns discussed in Part I are small. For example, the
TOT efficiently allocates risks, creates efficient contracting, and
does not entail inefficient noncontracting. Moreover, absent an
information gap, TOTs should also be presumed to be fair. The
conclusion of the law and economics literature, therefore, is that a
TOT’s efficiency hinges solely on whether consumers are sufficiently
informed. The problem, however, is that it is hard to know whether
a large enough number of consumers is sufficiently informed. Even
if such an information gap is somehow proven to exist, that by itself,
as we demonstrate, does not mean that the TOT is inefficient.
Accordingly, the focus on whether consumers are informed, de-
manded by the law and economics literature, to a large extent leads
to a dead end.
We propose a totally different methodology for assessing TOTs
that circumvents this problem: when applying the unconscionability
doctrine, courts should look not directly at whether an information
gap exists, but at whether competition in the supplier’s market is
expected to close the information gap. The virtue of this new
methodology is that courts have useful tools to observe the strength
of such competition, even when they cannot assess whether there is
an information gap.
Existing literature focusing on whether consumers are informed
overlooks the fact that even the proven existence of an information
gap is insufficient to justify intervention because the mere threat of
competition, in a given case, could incentivize suppliers to adopt
121. See Mann, supra note 64, at 918-19 (arguing that courts that apply the
unconscionability doctrine with sufficient vigor “are likely to do a poor job of sorting provisions
that make economic sense from those that reflect overreaching”). 
122. See supra Part I.A.2.
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only efficient and fair TOTs, even when consumers are uninformed.
That is, even in markets in which suppliers have not actually
exposed each other’s TOTs, the mere threat of such competitive
actions would deter suppliers from employing TOTs that cause
inefficiency or unfairness. On the other hand, in cases where
competition over contracts is not strong enough to close the
information gap, courts should be suspicious of TOTs and take a
closer look at them. In Part III.B, we provide workable guidelines
for courts regarding the application of this new methodology. 
B. Guidelines for Intervention Under the Market-Based Method
In the case of TOTs, competition has the potential of closing the
information gap between suppliers and consumers. But whether this
potential will be realized in a particular case depends on the type of
TOT or transaction, and most importantly, on the characteristics of
the supplier’s market. Naturally, before exploring the degree of
competition over contracts, the kind of competition that could close
the information gap, the court should examine how intense com-
petition over price or quality is. If the supplier is a monopolist, for
example, the TOT should be assessed according to the court’s
existing methodology.123 The same is true if the supplier operates in
a market with only a few firms and the court finds that the market
is susceptible to tacit or explicit collusive behavior.124 In such a case,
too, courts cannot count upon competition to close the information
gap because suppliers in such a market lack sufficient incentives to
act so as to entice away customers from another supplier. This pre-
liminary examination of the degree of competition in the supplier’s
123. See Rozeboom v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 358 N.W.2d 241, 242-45 (S.D. 1984) (striking down
a term because the seller was monopolistic).
124. In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 87-88 (N.J. 1960), for example,
the New Jersey Supreme Court, in striking down Chrysler’s restrictive warranty, emphasized
the fact that only three manufacturers, including Chrysler, controlled over 90 percent of the
passenger car market. Furthermore, the TOT in question was actually drafted by the
Automobile Manufacturers Association and hence could have constituted explicit collusion.
Id. at 87; see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV.
1151, 1169 (1976) (arguing that suppliers in concentrated markets may tacitly collude on
terms such as warranty coverage so as to facilitate an anticompetitive price).
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market is similar to the way federal courts deal with antitrust
cases.125
Once the court finds that the supplier is not a monopolist in his
market and that the market is not susceptible to collusive behavior,
it should examine whether competition over contracts might be
blocked in this market due to one or more of the four factors
discussed in Part II: backfiring, unwanted consumers, externaliza-
tion of benefits, and irresponsive consumers. In this Section we
propose a set of observable characteristics which courts could ex-
amine to determine to what extent the four factors prevent suppliers
from revealing TOTs in their rivals’ contracts.126 As demonstrated,
the implementation of these insights provides several counterin-
tuitive results.
If, after taking account of these characteristics, a court finds that
competition over contracts is able to close the information gap, it
should not intervene against the TOT. If such competition is unable
to close the information gap, the court should be particularly
suspicious of the TOT. We propose that in such a case, the burden
of proof be transferred to the supplier to show that the TOT is
nevertheless efficient and fair. If this burden is not met, the court
should intervene against the TOT under the doctrine of uncon-
scionability.
In what follows, we first consider observable characteristics
related to the TOT or the transaction itself that shed light on the
expected intensity of competition over contracts. These characteris-
tics concern the type of TOT and the type of transaction rather than
125. See, e.g., New York v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321, 358-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(examining the implications of a merger in the market for breakfast cereals); United States
v. CBS, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 832, 835-39 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (examining the commercial television
market and its submarkets); see also 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552,
41,558-60 (Sept. 10, 1992) (discussing the characteristics that make a market prone to tacit
collusion); SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 67, at 235-38; TIROLE, supra note 44, at 239-43. The
merger guidelines also demonstrate how the market in which the supplier operates needs to
be defined. See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41,554-58.
126. An interesting question is whether competition over contracts could pressure suppliers
into giving up not only on inefficient TOTs, but also on efficient TOTs. See Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1231 (1983)
(arguing that the competitive outcome does not reflect consumers’ preferences when they are
unable to understand their contracts). Apparently, this could occur only if such competition
did not perfectly inform consumers. See id. But even if that could happen, it should not affect
courts’ decisions when they assess a TOT actually included in a contract. 
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the particular attributes of the parties involved. Then we portray
observable characteristics related to the market in which the
supplier is operating.
1. The Type of TOT or Transaction
a. Does Exposing the TOT Reveal Information About the
Product or Service? 
Recall that consumers’ backfiring on the product occurs only when
criticizing the oppressive technique reveals negative information as
to the product or service sold by the criticizing supplier. Such
backfiring does not occur when the criticism reveals negative
information only about the criticized supplier. To illustrate, in
Example 1, where the TOT relieves the supplier of liability for late
delivery, exposing the TOT does not involve negative information
about TVs or their supply in general, but rather only negative
information about the supplier who employed this TOT. Further-
more, criticism about a TOT that reveals negative information about
the product does not always trigger consumers’ backfiring on the
product. To illustrate, in Example 2 (the Dry Cleaner), if the risk of
damage to clothes from dry cleaning is already salient to consumers,
or if a competing dry cleaner uses a different technology than Dry
Cleaner X in which there is hardly any risk to clothes, the compet-
ing dry cleaner would hesitate less to expose Dry Cleaner X’s
oppressive term. In such cases, the information implied by the
criticism does not affect the demand for the criticizing supplier’s
product or service. On the other hand, if harm to clothes is a
possibility at any dry cleaner’s facility, and consumers are not aware
of this possibility, a rival dry cleaner may hesitate to criticize Dry
Cleaner X’s TOT. 
b. Effects of Exposing the TOT on High-Cost Consumers
As we have explained, sometimes it is possible to predict which
consumers would be the first to leave their supplier if they were to
be informed of his TOT. In Example 2 (the Dry Cleaner), the first
to leave are consumers whose clothes are expensive. These are
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typically high-cost consumers. Rival dry cleaners might find these
consumers unattractive and accordingly might avoid criticizing the
TOT in the first place. This is typically the case with many
exclusionary clauses, which cap the supplier’s liability for harm. The
first consumers to leave the supplier when they become informed of
the TOT are those who pose the greatest risk of harm.
Another typical example of a TOT, the exposing of which could
attract high-cost consumers, is a TOT dealing with litigation over
complications in the contract, such as arbitration or jurisdiction.127
The first consumers to react to the exposition of such a TOT in their
contract are consumers who believe that they will be more likely
to be involved in litigation with the supplier. These are typically
high-cost consumers. A similar problem could exist with TOTs that
improve the supplier’s ability to enforce the consumer’s contractual
obligations.128 When a rival exposes such a TOT, the first consumers
who would react and switch to the criticizing supplier are consumers
who believe they might not fulfill all of their contractual obligations.
Obviously, these are unwanted consumers. These insights could
justify courts’ relatively strict treatment of TOTs dealing with
exclusionary clauses, litigation or arbitration, or suppliers’ tools to
enforce consumers’ obligations,129 but for reasons different than
those currently given by courts. Courts’ justifications for interven-
tion in such cases hinge mainly on “substantive unconscionability,”
that is, the TOTs in question seem particularly one-sided, draco-
nian, or harsh.130 We claim that the justification for intervention
127. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 312 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
that a class action waiver provision is “incompatible with the federal substantive law of
arbitration”); Matterhorn, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 763 F.2d 866, 873-75 (7th Cir. 1985) (denying
a seller’s motion to compel arbitration because the buyer did not clearly intend to be bound
by arbitration). 
128. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 110, at 163-67 (“Seller may also include a waiver
of defense clause, and if the sale is on secured credit, may include a clause that gives the
seller a right to repossess if it ‘deems itself insecure.’”).
129. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc. 6 P.3d 669, 679-80 (Cal.
2000). 
130. See, e.g., Affholter v. Franklin County Water Dist., No. 1:07-CV-0388, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 106254, at *51-61 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2008) (granting defendant’s motion to compel
arbitration because the arbitration provision was not substantively unconscionable); Harper
v. Ultimo, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 418, 425 (Ct. App. 2003) (“[I]f an arbitration clause does not achieve
‘minimum levels of integrity’ it would ‘be denied enforcement in any circumstances,’ but all
the more so where it is in a contract of adhesion. That is, adhesion was not essential to a
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here is not the harshness of the TOTs, but rather the fact that such
TOTs are unlikely to be competed away due to rivals’ fear of
attracting unwanted consumers.131
c. Scope of Transactions
When the transaction size is large, consumers are expected to be
more responsive to criticism of TOTs. For example, if instead of the
TV sets in Example 1, Supplier X’s TOT referred to the sale of a car,
even consumers who had failed to read Supplier X’s fine print might
be alert to rivals’ ads exposing Supplier X’s TOT. Here, rivals’
incentives to engage in such criticism would be enhanced because
consumers would be more responsive to their efforts.132
d. Does the TOT Qualify a Default Rule or a Contractual
Benefit?
Our proposed market-based approach explains why a TOT
qualifying a default rule—such as an implied warranty—should be
treated more strictly than a TOT qualifying a benefit granted by the
supplier himself—such as an express warranty. This can be
demonstrated through a variation of Example 2 (the Dry Cleaner).
Suppose that the Dry Cleaner offers consumers, in the salient part
of his contract, an express warranty covering “any damage to
clothes.” The TOT in question, in the fine print, qualifies the express
warranty and says, “Clothes will be covered for damage not
exceeding fifty dollars.” At first blush, it seems that such a TOT
finding of unconscionability.” (quoting Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 617
(1981))). 
131. Another example, borrowed from Bebchuk and Posner, is a term in a contract between
a publisher and authors, according to which the publisher is allowed to publish the book after
the time scheduled for authors’ final approval of proofs, even if the authors have failed to meet
the deadline for approval. Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 34, at 830-31. This example
demonstrates Bebchuk and Posner’s argument that one-sided terms in consumer contracts
allow selective enforcement by suppliers, which could be efficient. Id. We suggest that if the
term is inefficient, competition over contracts among publishers is unlikely to touch upon such
a term, because rival publishers understand that the first authors to leave the publisher using
the one-sided term would be those who expect to be late in approving their book’s proofs. 
132. Cf. Mann, supra note 64, at 900 (explaining consumers’ inattentiveness to credit
transactions by the small size of the transactions). 
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should be treated strictly because consumers who only read the
salient part of the contract are deceived by the TOT. But if the
supplier’s market is competitive, the conclusion could change in
light of the proposed market-based method. Because the express
warranty is offered in the salient part of the contract, it must mean
that backfiring on the product and attraction of unwanted custom-
ers are relatively weak; had they been strong, the supplier would
not have wanted to highlight the existence of the express warranty.
Emphasizing that damage to clothes is covered informs consumers
that such damage could occur, possibly causing backfiring on the
product, and could attract high-cost consumers, who particularly
appreciate such a warranty. Hence when such an express warranty
exists, these two factors can be presumed to be insignificant. For the
same reason, rival suppliers would not be deterred from highlight-
ing the existence of the TOT qualifying the express warranty. They
too would not fear backfiring on the product and attraction of
unwanted consumers. The same is true for consumer irrespon-
siveness: if the supplier makes an effort to make his warranty
salient, this must mean that such a warranty is important to
consumers. Consumers are also expected to be alert to rivals’ ads
stressing that the warranty is actually qualified. Accordingly,
competition over contracts is relatively strong in this case—subject
to benefit externalization—and intervention is less justified.
Suppose now that the TOT qualifies an implied warranty, set in
a default rule, rather than qualifying an express warranty, granted
by the supplier himself. In such a case, backfiring on the product,
attraction of unwanted consumers, and consumer irresponsiveness
may well be strong, thereby stifling competition over contracts.
Therefore, such a TOT may deserve closer scrutiny than the TOT
qualifying the express warranty.133
133. The analysis could change in particular circumstances. For example, a computer
supplier could have an express warranty for “any damage or loss” and qualify it with a TOT
saying that the warranty “does not cover damage due to fire caused by a defect in the
computer.” Here, the express warranty itself could be too general to cause backfiring on the
product. Still, rivals may hesitate to highlight the existence of the TOT, so as not to inform
consumers that defects in computers could cause fire.
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2. Characteristics of the Supplier’s Market
a. Number of Suppliers in the Market Not Using the TOT
Suppose Supplier X is a dry cleaner in a certain area of New York
City using a TOT like the one in Example 2, which caps his liability
for damaged clothes. Imagine this TOT is attacked in court. The
court could use the number of other suppliers in the market—all dry
cleaners in the above-mentioned area of New York City—not using
a similar TOT in order to assess the strength of the benefit external-
ization factor.134 If rival suppliers not using a similar TOT are too
numerous, a supplier who exposes Supplier X’s TOT may fear that
the benefits from such exposition would be shared by all suppliers
not using the TOT. Consumers might leave Supplier X in favor of
another supplier not using the TOT, although not necessarily in
favor of the criticizing supplier. Suppose, for example, that the TOT
is used only by Dry Cleaner X and is not used by five competing dry
cleaners. Here, benefit externalization is particularly great, and the
chance that one of Supplier X’s five rivals would want to expose
Supplier X’s TOT are slight.
This further implies that benefit externalization is smaller, and
hence competition over contracts is stronger, the larger the number
of suppliers there are in the market who use similar TOTs. This
result stands in stark contrast to courts’ and scholars’ conventional
premise, according to which an oppressive term has a greater
chance of being struck down if many or all suppliers in a market use
that term.135 The analysis above shows that the opposite may be
134. To this end, the court needs to define the relevant market in which Dry Cleaner X
operates, that is, answer the question, “who are Dry Cleaner X’s rivals?” This is a task
routinely fulfilled by courts in antitrust cases. See supra note 125.
135. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Serv. Corp. of Ala., Inc., 453 So. 2d 735, 739 & n.5 (Ala. 1984); Taylor
v. Leedy & Co., 412 So. 2d 763, 766 (Ala. 1982) (striking down an exculpatory clause in a lease
because “almost all leases contain these exculpatory clauses”); Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276
N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 1971); see also Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943) (“The weaker party,
in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in a position to shop around for better terms
... because all competitors use the same clauses.”); Julian S. Lim, Comment, Tongue-Tied in
the Market: The Relevance of Contract Law to Racial-Language Minorities, 91 CAL. L. REV.
579, 616-17 (2003); John P. Little, Note, Managed Care Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating
the Doctor-Patient Relationship and Endangering Patient Health, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1397,
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true: if most suppliers use a similar TOT, and the market is
competitive in other respects,136 benefit externalization is small, and
competition over contracts may well be strong. In such a market,
had the TOT been inefficient or unfair, any of the suppliers, and
especially those not using the TOT, may well have had a strong
incentive to expose it, subject to the other three factors that could
hinder such incentives, because the benefits from such exposure
would not be externalized. This could support a conclusion that
the TOT is actually efficient and fair, notwithstanding its harsh
appearance.
Conversely, courts often treat a supplier’s TOT leniently when
the consumer is shown to have a choice of rival suppliers who do not
use a similar TOT.137 But again, the preceding analysis shows that
this sort of reasoning is flawed: the more numerous the supplier’s
rivals who do not use the TOT, the less likely it is that the TOT will
be competed away, and the more suspicious courts should be of it.
In such cases, rivals will be less likely to expose the supplier’s TOT,
because they will fear that the benefits from such an exposition will
be externalized to the other suppliers not using the oppressive term.
To be sure, if all suppliers in the market use the TOT, or similar
TOTs, although benefit externalization does not exist, all such
suppliers would fear consumer backfiring on the contract: they
1423 (1997) (“While MCOs compete with each other on price and benefits, most MCOs employ
standard-form contracts with remarkably similar terms.”).
136. If there are only a few suppliers in the market, and the market is prone to collusive
behavior, courts should be mindful of the concern that all or most suppliers in a market use
a similar TOT, because suppliers are tacitly or expressly colluding. See supra notes 123-24
and accompanying text. This was probably the case in Henningsen v. Bloomfield, Inc., 161
A.2d 69, 87-88 (N.J. 1960), where the market was extremely concentrated and the TOT had
been dictated by an association composed of the suppliers. See supra note 124.
137. See, e.g., Bradberry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 06-6567 CW, 2007 WL 1241936, at
*5-6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2007) (implying that had the defendant brought evidence “regarding
the availability of alternative sources of cellular phone service without the allegedly
unconscionable terms,” it might have prevailed); Pack v. Damon Corp., 320 F. Supp. 2d 545,
556 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (finding no procedural unconscionability in an arbitration clause
because the “[p]laintiff has not shown that [defendant] was his only source for buying a new
motor home, or that other potential sources required submitting disputes to arbitration”);
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 789, 798 (Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]he
‘oppression’ factor of the procedural element of unconscionability may be defeated, if the
complaining party has a meaningful choice of reasonably available alternative sources of
supply from which to obtain the desired goods and services free of the terms claimed to be
unconscionable.”).
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might hesitate to expose rivals’ TOTs so as not to have to stop using
their own TOTs. Therefore, the ideal market in this respect is one
in which almost all suppliers use the TOT or similar practices. In
such a case, the few suppliers not using the TOT, or similar TOTs,
are not exposed to consumer backfiring on the contract because they
are not using such TOTs to begin with, and benefit externalization
remains particularly small because the number of rivals not using
such TOTs is small.
b. The Existence of Sales Representatives in Contact with
Consumers
The analysis of Part II reveals that when Supplier X’s rivals
employ sales representatives who are in direct contact with
consumers, these rivals are more likely to expose Supplier X’s TOTs.
Suppose again that Supplier X is the Dry Cleaner employing the
TOT from Example 2. Assume Dry Cleaner X has a rival, Dry
Cleaner Y. Dry Cleaner Y’s employees, operating Y’s facility, are in
direct contact with customers. They could use this direct contact to
highlight the existence of Dry Cleaner X’s TOT.
Such direct interaction could help overcome consumer irrespon-
siveness and could mitigate the fear of rivals’ backfiring. It could
alleviate consumers’ irresponsiveness because consumers present at
Y’s facility are more alert to the direct messages conveyed to them
by Y’s employees and agents. Direct contact also relieves some of Y’s
fear of retaliation from Supplier X because, unlike criticism made
via public advertising, Supplier X need not know that Supplier Y’s
employees have criticized him in this manner.
Conversely, if Supplier X’s rivals do not have such direct contact
with consumers, they are less likely to expose Supplier X’s TOT.
Suppose, for example, that Supplier X, like his rivals, sells elec-
tronic products over the Internet.138 Absent direct contact between
Supplier X’s rivals and consumers, consumer irresponsiveness and
the fear of Supplier X’s retaliation may, in certain cases, deter
Supplier X’s rivals from criticizing his contracts.139
138. See Hillman, supra note 111, at 840-42 (explaining that online consumers tend not to
read their contracts because negotiation is impossible). 
139. Although the absence of sales representatives does not necessarily imply that
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c. Is the Product or Service Essential to Consumers?
Suppose the product or service sold by the supplier using the TOT
is essential to consumers, such as a drug that cures a certain illness,
but the supplier’s market is nevertheless competitive. For example,
suppose there are several other suppliers who sell drugs that cure
the same illness. How should courts treat a TOT exempting a
supplier from liability for the drug’s side effects? Courts treat such
TOTs with particular suspicion and often strike them down as
unconscionable.140 
In contrast, our analysis reveals that such TOTs are actually less
susceptible to backfiring on the product, and in this sense are more
exposed to competition over contracts. The reason is that when a
product or service is essential to consumers, they would not easily
give up purchasing it. As a result, rival suppliers of such products
or services would not hesitate to criticize a supplier using such a
TOT, subject to the other factors that could hinder competition over
contracts. These rival suppliers know that even if their criticism
would reveal unpleasant information about the product or service,
consumers would still buy it. In the above-mentioned drug example,
rival suppliers would not hesitate to highlight that in the fine print
their rival exempts itself from liability for the drug’s side effects. If
the drug is essential to consumers, demand for the drug would not
decrease substantially, despite consumers having become aware of
its side effects. Therefore, under our approach, with essential pro-
ducts or services sold by a competitive industry, courts should
actually count more on competition over contracts, and intervene
less, than with other products and services in which there is a
threat of backfiring on the product.
consumers are irresponsive, it demands that the question of consumers’ responsiveness be
further examined.
140. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963) (“As a
result of the essential nature of [medical services], in the economic setting of the transaction,
the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against
any member of the public who seeks his services.”); Ransburg v. Richards, 770 N.E.2d 393,
401-03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (striking down an exculpatory clause due to the essential nature
of the service); Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754, 758-60 (Tenn. 1992).
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d. Alternative Parties Likely To Expose the TOT
As noted, at times the exposition of a supplier’s inefficient or
unfair TOT could come from parties other than the supplier’s rivals,
such as consumer organizations or websites.141 Such parties could
play a role similar to that of competition over contracts in deterring
suppliers from placing inefficient or unfair TOTs in their fine print.
Note that this deterrent effect is not subject to backfiring, attraction
of unwanted consumers, or benefit externalization. These are factors
that restrain only rivals’ criticism of the supplier’s TOT and not
criticism by objective parties from outside the supplier’s market.
Accordingly, if the court finds that in the supplier’s market,
oppressive terms in consumer contracts are subject to close scrutiny
by reliable parties whose interests coincide with those of consumers,
and in addition, many consumers are likely to become informed by
such parties, court intervention is unnecessary.
141. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
2010] VIEWING UNCONSCIONABILITY 193
The above-mentioned guidelines for courts are summarized in the
following table.
TABLE 2: GUIDELINES FOR COURTS
Prima Facie Case for Intervention No Intervention
Criticizing TOT provides negative
information about the
product/service
(consumers’ backfiring on the
product)
Criticizing TOT provides negative
information about the supplier
(no consumers’ backfiring on the
product)
Criticizing TOT attracts high-cost
consumers
(unwanted consumers)
Criticizing TOT attracts low-cost
or average consumers
(wanted consumers)
Small transactions
(irresponsive consumers)
Large transactions
(responsive consumers)
TOT qualifies a default rule
(backfiring on the product, attrac-
tion of unwanted consumers, and
consumer irresponsiveness could
be strong)
TOT qualifies an express benefit
granted by the supplier
(backfiring on the product, attrac-
tion of unwanted consumers, and
consumer irresponsiveness usually
weak)
Few suppliers use similar TOTs
(benefit externalization) 
Almost all suppliers use similar
TOTs
(most benefits internalized and no
concern of backfiring on the
contract)
No sales representatives
(rivals’ backfiring, risk of
irresponsive consumers)
Sales representatives exist
(less rivals’ backfiring, consumers
more responsive)
Product is inessential
(backfiring on the product possi-
ble)
Product is essential 
(no backfiring on the product)
No alternative parties likely to
expose the TOT (no alternative to
competition over contracts)
Alternative parties likely to expose
the TOT (an alternative to compe-
tition over contracts)
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To finalize our guidelines, it should be noted that our market-
based approach could also be employed ex ante rather than ex
post.142 That is, an agency could decide ex ante whether a standard
consumer contract was efficient according to our proposed guide-
lines, and once the agency decided affirmatively, the contract would
be immune from courts’ scrutiny for a certain period of time. There
are several advantages to ex ante scrutiny. First, it would save
litigation costs because the contract would be litigated only once,
while with ex post intervention, litigation reoccurs whenever con-
sumers sue the supplier. Second, a specialized agency conducting ex
ante scrutiny would likely be more apt and skillful than courts in
applying the market-based guidelines we propose. Finally, ex ante
scrutiny would promote certainty: once a contract was approved by
the agency, the supplier could be confident that none of his con-
tract’s clauses would be struck down.
CONCLUSION
This Article presents four oppressive techniques that suppliers
often use in their standard-form contracts to extract value from
uninformed consumers: TOTs, SOTs, SBTs, and complexity. Only
the first technique is closely scrutinized by courts. Ironically, courts’
attention is much more needed with respect to the other three
techniques, which courts currently ignore, because these techniques
are expected to survive even fierce competition among suppliers.
Especially two of these practices—SOTs and complexity—could lead
to substantial social harm if they are not closely scrutinized. 
TOTs, on the other hand, are potentially affected by competition.
The type of competition that affects TOTs is competition over
contracts, rather than over price or quality. When competition over
contracts exists, it has the potential to close the information gap
between suppliers and consumers, thereby securing efficient and
fair contracts. Furthermore, even a threat of such competition would
suffice in order to assure the efficiency and fairness of suppliers’
contracts.
142. Cf. Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge
That Is Yet To Be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723, 729-30 (2008) (arguing for ex ante scrutiny of
consumer contracts).
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Accordingly, we suggest that courts apply a market-based
approach to TOTs in consumer contracts instead of scrutinizing
TOTs on the basis of the discrete transaction and its particular
characteristics, as courts currently do under the doctrine of
unconscionability. According to the market-based approach, the
courts should apply the unconscionability doctrine in a different
manner: TOTs should be assessed in light of the intensity of
competition, or potential competition, over contracts in the sup-
plier’s market. This Article reveals the observable characteristics of
the supplier’s market, and the type of TOT or transaction, both of
which determine the viability of competition over contracts in this
market. When competition over contracts is shown to be able to
close the information gap, intervention against the TOT is unwar-
ranted. When competition over contracts cannot be counted upon to
inform consumers, the burden should be transferred to the supplier
to show that his TOT is nevertheless efficient and fair, as otherwise
the TOT will be struck down.
This Article thus presents a third phase in courts’ attitudes
toward consumer contracts. In the first phase, consumer contracts
were considered by courts as ordinary contracts, requiring no special
treatment. In the second phase, courts became suspicious of
consumer contracts and developed several tools for handling them,
focusing on the particular characteristics of the transaction. We
suggest that it is time to introduce a third phase: rather than
examining each consumer contract in isolation, courts need to
acknowledge that consumer contracts are a market phenomenon
that calls for a market-based approach.
